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I. INTRODUCTION 
In September 2017, the University of California Regents spearhead-
ed a major programmatic challenge to a U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security initiative under the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 
(APA).1  Because the APA directs courts to review the legality of agency 
action upon “the whole record,”2 the government filed what it deemed to 
be the complete administrative record of all non-deliberative documents 
considered by the agency when it undertook the challenged initiative.3  
The plaintiffs responded by arguing the record was missing thousands of 
pages of documents.4  The plaintiffs moved the court to order the De-
partment of Homeland Security to complete the administrative record.5 
Just five weeks after the lawsuit was filed, a federal district judge 
granted the plaintiffs’ motion.6  Despite later acknowledging that “[t]he 
Supreme Court has never defined ‘the whole record’ in the context of in-
formal agency action”—the kind of agency action at issue there7—the 
judge found that the government did not file a complete record.8  The 
court gave the government a mere ten days to complete the record with, 
among other things, “all emails, letters, memoranda, notes, media items, 
opinions and other materials directly or indirectly considered in the final 
agency decision,” including all materials considered by a cabinet secre-
tary and anyone who gave the secretary written or oral input.9  The court 
of appeals agreed.10 
But the proper scope of the record was an important enough issue 
that the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in with stunning alacrity—less than 
two months after the district court issued its order—deciding to stay the 
district court’s order over a vigorous dissent regarding the proper compo-
sition of the administrative record.11  Shortly thereafter the Court granted 
                                                            
 1.   Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211, 2017 WL 
4642324 (N.D. Cal.), aff’d sub nom., In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir.), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 
443 (2017); 5 U.S.C. §§ 550–709 (2012). 
 2.   5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 3.   Regents of Univ. of Cal., 2017 WL 4642324, at *1; 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 4.   Regents of Univ. of Cal., 2017 WL 4642324, at *1. 
 5.   Id. 
 6.   Id. at *8. 
 7.   Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211, 2018 WL 
1210551, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2018).  
 8.   Regents of Univ. of Cal., 2017 WL 4642324, at *8. 
 9.   Id. at *8–9.  
 10.   In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 11.   In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371 (2017); id. at 371–76 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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a writ of certiorari and issued a decision.12  Although its opinion in In re 
United States did not ultimately resolve the question, the Court vacated 
the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case for the district 
judge to resolve a threshold jurisdictional challenge before addressing 
record supplementation.13  Upon doing so, the district court again or-
dered supplementation of the administrative record in line with its inter-
pretation of the APA, again acknowledging the lack of direct precedent.14  
This case emblematizes broader judicial indeterminacy on what consti-
tutes “the whole record” for purposes of APA administrative record re-
view. 
The scope and domain of the administrative record is critical to APA 
review because the record can have dispositive effects on litigation.  In 
another example, when the U.S. Department of Defense awarded a gov-
ernment contract to Lockheed Martin Federal Healthcare to help service 
its health care program, an unsuccessful competing bidder, Axiom Re-
source Management, filed an APA lawsuit alleging the contracting of-
ficer acted arbitrarily or capriciously by failing to satisfactorily address a 
Lockheed conflict of interest.15  Moving to permanently enjoin the De-
partment of Defense from awarding the contract to Lockheed, Axiom 
sought to supplement the agency record with affidavits that it had created 
for the litigation.16  The government objected on the ground that the APA 
limits the scope of judicial review to “the whole record”—the materials 
considered or relied upon by the agency.17 
The judge dismissed those objections.  “My practice . . . since I’ve 
been on the Court is to allow everybody to put . . . whatever they want to 
put into the record in trial and even in an administrative record to sup-
plement,” she said.18  Her reasons seemed practical enough: “My own 
view is that I don’t know what’s important or not until I finally get 
around to looking at the record,” and “[i]f it goes up on appeal, that way 
the Appellate Court has a full record to work with.”19  The judge prom-
ised that “[j]ust because it’s in the record doesn’t mean I’m going to rely 
on it for any reason,” finding that this practice would not prejudice the 
                                                            
 12.   In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017) (per curiam). 
 13.   Id. at 445. 
 14.   Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211, 2018 WL 
1210551, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2018). 
 15.   Axiom Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 16.   Id. at 1378. 
 17.   Id. at 1379. 
 18.   Id. (alteration in original) (quoting a transcript of the district court judge’s comments at a 
telephone conference with the parties). 
 19.   Id. 
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government.20  The court invited both sides to submit extra evidence and 
to not “hold back,” urging a sense of perspective: “The world will not 
come to an end.  Western civilization will not crumble based upon this 
value judgment.”21  After evaluating newly added evidence, the judge 
granted Axiom’s motion and permanently enjoined Lockheed from per-
forming the contract.22 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
acknowledged the need for an adequate record during APA judicial re-
view.23  However, the court emphasized that the relevant Supreme Court 
cases from the 1970s and 1980s limit review to the record actually before 
the agency, to “guard against courts using new evidence to convert the 
arbitrary and capricious standard into effectively de novo review.”24  The 
Federal Circuit concluded that the lower court had not made any deter-
mination that judicial review was hindered by a lack of evidence and that 
more evidence was necessary.25  Reproducing the judge’s remarks about 
uncritical record supplementation, the court of appeals reversed the 
judge’s decision as an abuse of discretion.26 
These two anecdotal cases are representative of a larger problem 
within the bench and bar regarding what materials may be reviewed by a 
federal court when it engages in APA review of agency action.  This Ar-
ticle examines the federal courts’ varying views on the scope of adminis-
trative records for APA purposes.  Although the APA is an omnibus 
waiver of sovereign immunity that facilitates the judicial review of thou-
sands of executive branch actions, the statute provides a minimalist defi-
nition of the evidence that courts should consider in its scope of review 
provision: “the court shall review the whole record.”27  Juxtaposed 
against the breadth and prescriptive richness of other authorities that 
govern federal civil litigation such as the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the APA’s evidentiary 
scheme is distinctly different.  Taken with the APA’s differing procedur-
al requirements for various actions that are subject to judicial review, 
which in turn animates the positive or absence of positive requirements 
for administrative record content, the answer to what constitutes “the 
                                                            
 20.   Id. 
 21.   Id. 
 22.   Axiom Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 530, 539–40 (2008). 
 23.   Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1379. 
 24.   Id. at 1380 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25.   Id. at 1379. 
 26.   Id. at 1380–81. 
 27.   5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
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whole record” is highly reliant on case law. 
This case law, however, has developed in the lower courts while the 
Supreme Court has not yet provided clarification or guidance.  The prin-
cipal case from which the Supreme Court’s administrative record juris-
prudence flows did not come until twenty-five years after the APA was 
enacted, in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.28  Although 
Overton Park has been cursorily validated by a few other Supreme Court 
cases since, the Supreme Court has not seriously grappled with the issue 
since 1990.29  Recently, the Supreme Court gave litigants hope when it 
took up cases involving the scope of the APA record.  But in 2017, the 
Supreme Court’s In re United States decision did not address the issue 
despite a vigorous four-Justice dissent proposing to do so.30  Again in 
2018, the Supreme Court, in a case about the Secretary of Commerce’s 
decision to include a question about citizenship on the next decennial 
census, issued an order in the case but has thus far refrained from reach-
ing the merits, thus showcasing the persistence of this unsettled issue.31 
This Article argues that in the presence of ambiguous Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the subject and the thirty-year absence of significant ju-
risprudence on administrative records, the lower courts’ views on the 
definition of an administrative record are suffering from significant in-
terdecisional inconsistency and varying correctness. 
Part II of the Article surveys the historical practices of agencies in 
compiling, maintaining, and furnishing administrative records.  It chroni-
cles the federal courts’ treatment of administrative records upon judicial 
review, both before and after the passage of the APA.  It reviews the 
sparse Supreme Court case law addressing the topic, starting with Over-
ton Park. 
Part III analyzes the circumstances in which a party may add materi-
als to the administrative record presented in federal court.  Identifying 
the proper avenue as mere record completion—as opposed to record sup-
plementation—Part III explains the basis for such a rule and why it is 
consistent with the APA’s text, structure, and history, and all Supreme 
Court holdings and dicta on the topic.  Part III then surveys the practical 
manner in which this process should proceed, by considering the liti-
gants’ perspective and the federal courts’ local rules and practices. 
                                                            
 28.   401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 29.   See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653–56 (1990). 
 30.   See In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371 (2017). 
 31.   In re Dep’t of Commerce, No. 18A375, 2018 WL 5259090 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2018).  The re-
search in this Article is current through October 29, 2018.  
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Part IV observes how the APA record rule is interpreted in practice.  
It concludes that many advocates challenging informal adjudications and 
nonlegislative (or subregulatory) rulemaking are successfully putting be-
fore courts a judicial record that is broader than the relatively narrow 
administrative “record” contemplated by the statute and Overton Park.  
Part IV explains how the many court-made exceptions to the APA record 
rule are inconsistent with the correct interpretation detailed in Part III.  
Part IV argues that private litigants’ successes advocating for judicial 
recognition of administrative records that are broader than that which is 
contemplated by the APA promotes gaps and pockets of error in the case 
law.  Part IV hypothesizes how and why some members of the bench and 
bar misread the “whole record” requirement. 
Part V explains why, despite those reasons in Part IV, judges and lit-
igants should comport with the correct interpretation of the APA record 
rule discussed in this Article.  This Part suggests mechanisms to normal-
ize this rule and socialize parties to the correct operation of the APA and 
its record rule, including, for example, a recommendation for courts to 
adopt local rules to help to stabilize the space. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Agencies and Agency Actions 
To appreciate the evidence necessary to review agency actions under 
the APA, it is helpful to understand the types of agency action that the 
statute empowers courts to review.  The APA broadly affords judicial re-
view to a “person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a 
relevant statute.”32  An agency action cannot be reviewed until it is fi-
nal.33  “Agency action” is defined non-exhaustively to “include[] the 
whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the 
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.”34 
The APA establishes specific requirements for two primary types of 
agency action, rulemaking and adjudication.35  The APA recognizes both 
                                                            
 32.   5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
 33.   Id. § 704. 
 34.   Id. §§ 701(b)(2), 551(13). 
 35.   See id. §§ 553–554; LELAND E. BECK, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, AGENCY PRACTICES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS IN INFORMAL 
RULEMAKING 3 (2013) (“Case law on administrative records has not developed along discrete lines 
of ‘rulemaking’ or ‘adjudication’ or ‘hybrid’ proceedings, but more generally, and therefore cases 
that might appear to be technically applicable only under one statute are often applied to more gen-
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formal and informal rulemaking, although formal rulemaking has func-
tionally been discontinued.36  Informal rulemaking subdivides into legis-
lative and nonlegislative rulemaking.37  Legislative rules are official 
agency promulgations that have “the force and effect of law.”38  Legisla-
tive rulemaking requires an agency to give the public notice of the pro-
posed rulemaking and an opportunity to submit their views.39 
Nonlegislative rules, in contrast, do not carry the force of law.40  
Such rules include an agency’s “interpretive rules,” which announce how 
the agency has decided to interpret a statute or regulation.41  They also 
include subregulatory policy statements, which notify the public of the 
agency’s current enforcement or regulatory priorities.42  And they in-
clude “rules of agency organization, procedure, [and] practice.”43 
For formal adjudication, an agency must provide an oral evidentiary 
hearing and issue a decision that includes findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law.44  The APA is silent on what, specifically, informal adjudi-
cation means or requires.  Case law interpreting the APA holds that for-
mal findings are not required, but an agency must have some sort of 
process or procedure in place that produces some type of contemporane-
ous evidence.45 
Finally, the APA definition of “agency action” includes the failure of 
an agency to act, thus agency “action” can also mean a finalized state of 
inaction.46 
                                                            
erally on judicial review of agency action under the statute is governed by the APA.”). 
 36.   Aram A. Gavoor & Daniel Miktus, Public Participation in Nonlegislative Rulemaking, 61 
VILL. L. REV. 759, 769 (2016) (citing United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 227–28 
(1973)). 
 37.   Id. at 770 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)). 
 38.   Id. (citing William Funk, When is a “Rule” a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between 
Nonlegislative Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 659 (2002)). 
 39.   5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c).  The APA exempts certain subjects from these requirements, for 
example, legislative rules concerning “a military or foreign affairs function.”  Id. § 553(a)(1). 
 40.   5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
 41.   5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015); TOM 
C. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 
(1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL] (defining these as “rules or statements issued 
by an agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it ad-
ministers”). 
 42.   5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993); ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
MANUAL, supra note 41 (defining these as “statements issued by an agency to advise the public pro-
spectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power”). 
 43.   5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). 
 44.   Id. §§ 554, 556–557; see id. §§ 558–59. 
 45.   Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416–18 (1971), abrogated on 
other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
 46.   5 U.S.C. § 551(13); Coal. for Sustainable Res., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 259 F.3d 1244, 
 
8 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
B. Administrative Records, Generally 
The federal adjudication and, to a lesser extent, rulemaking apparatus 
is enormous.  By one estimate, adjudication is exercised by forty-eight 
executive agencies,47 using approximately 1,931 administrative law 
judges.48  The Social Security Administration alone has a 1.1-million-
case backlog.49  Regarding rulemaking, federal agencies issued 3,281 fi-
nal rules in 2017 and 3,853 final rules in 2016—compared to a total of 
329 bills and joint resolutions passed during the entire 114th Congress 
between January 2015 and January 2017.50  By one estimate, twenty-six 
executive agencies promulgated an “economically significant rule” or “a 
rule through a process that included a formal hearing” between 1998 and 
2013.51  This process takes time; before promulgating a rule, an agency 
must undertake a rigorous analysis that includes, for example, identifying 
regulatory priorities and outlining a regulatory agenda.52 
Agencies have had to defend their adjudication and rulemaking pro-
                                                            
1251 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 47.   DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 130–31 tbl.19 (2d prtg. 2013).  
This figure does not include “specific bureaus, offices, or divisions within departments or agencies 
authorized to adjudicate or employing administrative law judges.” Id. at 131.  These agencies are 
counted if: (1) their main authorizing statute includes provisions authorizing adjudication; (2) their 
main authorizing state includes reference to adjudicatory portion of the APA, i.e., § 554; (3) they 
employ administrative law judges, per the Association of ALJs; or (4) they employ administrative 
law judges, per Justice Breyer in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 
U.S. 477, 542–43 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 48.   Office of Personnel Mgmt., Federal Administrative Law Judges by agency and level 
(EHRI-SDM as of March 2017), https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-
judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency [https://perma.cc/ADB3-3KGS] (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).  This fig-
ure is up from approximately 1,584 administrative law judges in 2010, Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 
542–43 (Breyer, J., dissenting), and 1,350 administrative law judges in 2004.  Michael Asimow, The 
Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s Adjudication Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings Re-
quired by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (2004).  The Office of Personnel Management’s 
1,931 figure is surely under-inclusive, however, as it does not appear to count the “approximately 
350” immigration judges.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge-bios [https://perma.cc/85GS-
8VKM] (last visited Oct. 10, 2018). 
 49.   SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT: FACTORS RELAT-
ED TO DECREASED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE PRODUCTIVITY 1 (2017).  In 2016, the Social Se-
curity Administration had 1,654 administrative law judges who issued at least one disposition.  Id. at 
2 tbl.1.  
 50.   OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, FEDERAL REGISTER DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED 1976–
2017, https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2018/03/docsPublished2017.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/3U4A-2SX5] (last visited July 16, 2018); Statistics and Historical Comparison, GovTrack, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics [https://perma.cc/6SBB-KGCW] (last visited Oct. 
10, 2018). 
 51.   LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 47, at 132 tbl.20. 
 52.   Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
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cesses and actions with increasing frequency.  Lawsuits against federal 
agencies may be becoming more partisan as well.53 
Once APA lawsuits are filed, a court reviews the final agency action 
under the statute’s judicial review provisions, including 5 U.S.C. § 706.  
That section provides the standards for upholding agency action, includ-
ing the well-known arbitrary or capricious standard.54  In making those 
determinations, 5 U.S.C. § 706 says, “the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party.”55  The question central to this 
Article is what constitutes “the whole record.” 
Lawsuits against agencies revolve around the record that the agency 
created while completing the challenged action, for example, while adju-
dicating the dispute or making the rule at issue.  Before going further, it 
bears emphasis that a “record” means different things in different con-
texts for an agency.  This Article uses “administrative record” to mean 
“the whole record” upon which APA judicial review is founded.  But 
agencies maintain, generate, collect, or preserve information for many 
purposes besides defensive litigation.  An agency may maintain unoffi-
cial, uncoordinated, or ad hoc records as best practices or through the un-
coordinated actions of their employees.  Often, agencies develop rela-
tionships with records because of regulations or statutes.  Agencies may 
do so to comply with the Federal Records Act,56 but many other laws 
                                                            
 53.   See, e.g., Paul Nolette, State attorneys general have taken off as a partisan force in na-
tional politics, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/10/23/state-attorneys-general-have-taken-off-as-a-partisan-force-in-national-politics/? 
utm_term=.aa4109bfcb9c [https://perma.cc/XW3B-KUKC] (detailing the rise in litigation by state 
attorneys general against the federal government to challenge agency action); Neena Satija et al., 
Texas vs. the Feds—A Look at the Lawsuits, TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/01/17/texas-federal-government-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/ 
ER4Z-9DDD] (explaining that through nearly the end of Obama’s second term, the State of Texas 
had sued his administration at least 48 times, “a point of pride for the state’s Republican leaders”); 
Andrew Grossman, Regulation Through Sham Litigation: The Sue and Settle Phenomenon, HERIT-
AGE FOUND. (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/regulation-through-
sham-litigation-the-sue-and-settle-phenomenon [https://perma.cc/X4MW-3TVQ] (accusing the fed-
eral government of colluding with likeminded activist groups to be sued and then to settle on unac-
countable terms); Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
1739, 1760 & n.105 (2015) (detailing Congress’s increasing tendency to bring “high-profile lawsuits 
on party-line votes” and file “only partisan briefs”). 
 54.   5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (empowering a court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings, and conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
 55.   Id. § 706. 
 56.   See Federal Records Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 583 (current version as amended at scattered of 
44 U.S.C.); Harold J. Krent, Federal Agency Ombuds: The Costs, Benefits, and Countenance of 
Confidentiality, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 17, 26 (2000) (describing the broad imposition on agencies to 
make and preserve “documents relating to all official agency functions bearing on the formulation of 
agency policy, the conduct of agency personnel, and the agency’s impact on third parties”).  APA 
 
10 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
may apply depending on the agency.  These recordkeeping practices may 
or may not have incidental effect on the administrative record central to 
APA review.57 
While performing agency actions, an agency may generate an admin-
istrative record totaling thousands of pages.58  To take one example, the 
Food and Drug Administration’s record in one routine case was 133,000 
pages, reflecting 48,000 rulemaking comments.59  A Supreme Court dis-
senting opinion recently acknowledged an administrative record that ex-
ceeded a million pages.60  Other records, however, had only 40,000 pag-
es;61 another, a mere 761 pages.62  Conceivably, an administrative record 
could comprise only one page. 
The contents of an administrative record derive mostly from outside 
sources.63  Sometimes, however, a record will contain research that the 
agencies conducted.64 
                                                            
record content might be at least a record under the Federal Records Act.  The literature does not ap-
pear to have plumbed that question, which lies beyond the scope of this Article. 
 57.   The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012 & Supp. 2017), the Privacy Act of 
1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012 & Supp. 2017), the Presidential Records Act (44 U.S.C. § 2201–2207 
(2012 & Supp. 2016)), and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.) 
all affect agency records, as do executive orders.  E.g., Exec. Order No. 9,784, Providing for the 
More Efficient Use and for the Transfer and Other Disposition of Government Records, 11 Fed. Reg. 
10909 (Sept. 25, 1946), revoked, 19 Fed. Reg. 5963 (Sept. 15, 1954).  
 58.   Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 98 & n.11 (1983) 
(describing the “sheer volume” of proceedings). 
 59.   NVE Inc. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 436 F.3d 182, 188 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 60.   In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371, 374–75 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting from grant of 
stay) (citing Ga. ex rel. Olens v. McCarthy, 833 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2016)). 
 61.   New Jersey v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Civil Action Nos. 09-5591, 2010 WL 2771771, 
at *4 (D.N.J. July 13, 2010). 
 62.   Supreme Foodservice GmbH v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 369, 379 (2013). 
 63.   See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c) (2012) (“[T]he agency shall give interested persons an opportunity 
to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments . . . .”), 
556(d) (giving parties in formal adjudications the opportunity to present witnesses and evidence); 42 
U.S.C. § 7607(d)(2)–(6) (2012) (Clean Air Act provision requiring the EPA Administrator to “give 
interested persons an opportunity for the oral presentation of data, views, or arguments” when the 
EPA is promulgating a rule); 42 U.S.C. § 405 (2012 & Supp. 2017) (governing the receipt of evi-
dence at Social Security Title II hearings); 22 C.F.R. § 51.71(d) (2018) (in a passport revocation 
hearing before the Department of State, permitting the revoked passport’s bearer to offer evidence, 
present witnesses, and make arguments). 
 64.   See Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Re-
view as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 746–47 (2011); Thomas O. McGari-
ty, The Complementary Roles of Common Law Courts and Federal Agencies in Producing and Us-
ing Policy-Relevant Scientific Information, 37 ENVTL. L. 1027, 1028–29 (2007) (“The agencies have 
become repositories of huge amounts of scientific information that they may use in taking regulatory 
action or disseminate to the public by way of warnings or cautionary statements.”). 
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C. Compiling the Administrative Record for APA Litigation 
When agency action is challenged in federal court, the administrative 
record will rarely already exist in a form ready to submit to the court.  
Few agencies compile records as they are developed; if it does, it is pri-
marily for internal purposes or publication by a governmental third-party 
like the Federal Register.65  Because not every agency action is chal-
lenged in court, “[m]ost agencies develop a formal index only when nec-
essary for internal or judicial purposes.”66  Often, only after litigation has 
commenced do agencies consciously search their systems and compile 
the relevant documents. 
Regardless of whether litigation will certainly follow, agencies often 
maintain the documents that would be necessary to satisfy judicial re-
view requirements.67  Record inputs are defined, to varying degrees of 
specificity, by statutes,68 regulations,69 and case law.70  The APA is one 
such statute, although it is a procedural mandate and an omnibus waiver 
of sovereign immunity that may be supplanted by an agency’s more spe-
cific organic statute.71  The APA presumes agencies will generate a rec-
ord as they adjudicate or make rules, but the statute does not exhaustive-
ly define the procedures necessary to generate the record for all types of 
                                                            
 65.   See BECK, supra note 35, at 46. 
 66.   Id. 
 67.   Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 253, 
261 (2017). 
 68.   Substantive statutes include 16 U.S.C. § 1465(b)(2)–(3) (2012) (directing the Secretary of 
Commerce to close at a particular point the record in a Coastal Zone Management Act case and to 
not reopen it except under certain conditions) and 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(A) (2012) (defining the 
record for judicial review in Clean Air Act claims).  Procedural statutes include 28 U.S.C. § 2112(b) 
(2012) (requiring a record consisting of “the order sought to be reviewed or enforced, the findings or 
report upon which it is based, and the pleadings, evidence, and proceedings before the agency, 
board, commission, or officer concerned, or such portions thereof” for circuit court review of agency 
action); 15 U.S.C. § 2060(g)(2) (2012) (incorporating 28 U.S.C. § 2112’s record filing requirements 
in judicial review of Consumer Product Safety Act claims); FED. R. APP. P. 16(a), 17(b) & advisory 
committee’s notes to 1967 adoption (incorporating 28 U.S.C. § 2112). 
 69.   E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 300.810 (2018) (listing certain documents that “typically” should and 
should not be included in CERCLA administrative records); Id. § 24.03(b) (2017) (same, for Solid 
Waste Disposal Act actions).  
 70.   Compare, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Whitman, No. Civ.A. 3:02-0059, 2003 WL 
43377, at *5 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 6, 2003) (“[T]he administrative rulemaking process is precisely one of 
initial proposals, comments, compromise, revisions, and final drafts, and the materials produced in 
this process are typically part of the administrative record.”), with Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Lyons, 
871 F. Supp. 1291, 1308–09 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (finding that the administrative record was “legally 
sufficient” even though “[t]housands of pages of notes, memoranda, and other working documents 
and electronic communications were destroyed”), aff’d sub nom., Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Moseley, 
80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 71.   See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
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agency action. 
To ascertain the necessary contents of an administrative record, the 
agency and the affected individuals must consult the relevant standard of 
review for the type of agency action at issue and the relevant provision of 
the APA that identifies procedures for what was challenged.72  Formal 
rulemaking challenges, which seldom arise following the decline of for-
mal rulemaking in the 1970s, are reviewed on the “transcript of testimo-
ny and exhibits, together with all papers and requests filed in the pro-
ceeding.”73  The administrative record for formal rulemaking, then, must 
at a minimum include those materials.  Similarly, informal rulemaking, 
both legislative and nonlegislative, will generally include the materials 
required for those types of agency action: notices pertaining to the rule-
making, transcripts of oral presentations made in the course of the rule-
making, and reports of any advisory committees.74 
The formal adjudication record consists of the full hearing record, 
including prehearing conference agreements, official notice, and the de-
cision by the administrative law judge.75  Informal adjudication is not 
explicitly covered by the APA.  At minimum, informal adjudication rec-
ords require notice of the denial and “a brief statement of the grounds for 
denial” required in adjudications.76  For an agency’s failure to act, “be-
cause there is no final agency action to demarcate the limits of the rec-
ord,” judicial “review is not limited to the record as it existed at any sin-
gle point in time.”77  Although the APA does not require particular 
documents to be created for informal adjudication or agency inaction, the 
general principles of “the whole record” discussed in this Article apply 
just as equally to informal adjudication and agency inaction as they do to 
                                                            
 72.   See id. § 553 (legislative informal rulemaking); §§ 554, 556–557 (formal adjudication), id. 
§§ 553, 556–557 (formal rulemaking, although this process has fallen into modern disuse).  More 
generally, there are provisions like section 555(e), which promises affected individuals “[p]rompt 
notice” of, and the reasons for, any denial.  See Olivares v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 819 F.3d 454, 462–
63 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (calling this a “‘fundamental’ requirement of administrative law”). 
 73.   5 U.S.C. § 556(e); United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 236–38 (1973) 
(interpreting §§ 553, 556, and 557 of the APA to establish a high bar for when formal adjudication 
must occur: when an organic statute requires a hearing “on the record after opportunity for an agency 
hearing”); see also Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the Decline 
of the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 484–87 (2003) (discussing three categories of APA rules and 
the demise of formal rulemaking). 
 74.   See, e.g., Arkansas v. Zarb, No. 74-1186, 1975 WL 111, at *1 (D.D.C. July 31, 1975); Au-
tomo. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968); William F. Pedersen, 
Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 64, 66–67, 79 (1975); BECK, supra 
note 35, at 80 (recommending such as a best practice). 
 75.   5 U.S.C. § 556(e). 
 76.   Id. 
 77.   Friends of the Clearwater v. Dombeck, 222 F.3d 552, 560 (9th Cir. 2000).  
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the other forms of agency action for which the APA establishes a docu-
mentary minimum for the record. 
Because these materials are explicitly mentioned in the APA, they 
are, uncontroversial, the bare minimums the agency must produce as part 
of “the whole record.”  Beyond these basic parameters, different agencies 
have different policies on what should be maintained as an APA record.78  
The U.S. Department of Justice, which is charged by statute with repre-
senting most federal agencies in court,79 has previously released guid-
ance through its Environment and Natural Resources Division,80 which 
was mirrored by guidance released by the Executive Office for United 
States Attorneys.81  However, Department of Justice guidance to clients 
is exceptional to most agencies’ administrative-record guidance because 
the Department of Justice lacks the power to act with the force of law in 
                                                            
 78.   See, e.g., BECK, supra note 35, at 27–28 (comparing recordkeeping policies of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency with the Environmental and Natural Resources Division at the De-
partment of Justice); Daniel J. Rohlf, Avoiding the ‘Bare Record’: Safeguarding Meaningful Judicial 
Review of Federal Agency Actions, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 575, 601 (2009) (detailing Department of 
the Interior guidance calling for “a designated agency employee . . . to maintain a contemporaneous 
‘Decision File’ which contains ‘the complete “story” of the agency decision-making process, includ-
ing options considered and rejected by the agency’” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, STAND-
ARDIZED GUIDANCE ON COMPILING A DECISION FILE AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 2 (2006), 
http://www.fws.gov/policy/e1282fw5.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EJG-A4FE])). 
 79.   28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 3106. 
 80.   U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ENVT. & NAT. RES. DIV., GUIDANCE TO FEDERAL AGENCIES ON 
COMPILING THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 3 (1999), http://environment.transportation.org/ 
pdf/programs/usdoj_guidance_re_admin_record_prep.pdf [https://perma.cc/UDB8-KA6K] (advising 
agencies to maintain, in the administrative record, all records including those “the final decision-
maker did not actually review or know about”).  However, the Department of Justice has since dis-
counted this memo.  See Federal Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Completion of the Administrative Record and Production of a Privi-
lege Log and for Leave to Conduct Third Party Discovery at 22–23, Inst. for Fisheries Res. v. Bur-
well, No. 16-cv-01574, 2017 WL 89003 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2017), ECF No. 79.  Indeed, “the De-
partment of Justice issued a memorandum, after the 1999 memorandum, stating that the 
Administrative Agency was in charge of their own administrative records and the material that 
would be included in the record.”  Coastal Conservation Ass’n v. Locke, No. 2:09-cv-641, 2010 WL 
1439071, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2010); see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ENVTL. & NAT. RES. DIV., 
MEMORANDUM (Dec. 23, 2008) (stating that deliberative process does not fall within the definition 
of an administrative record); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ENVTL. & NAT. RES. DIV., MEMORANDUM 
(Oct. 20, 2017) (same).  Nevertheless, at least one court found this nonbinding guidance to be per-
suasive, and used the 1999 guidance against the government as a definition of what goes into the 
APA record.  In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, vacated and 
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 443. 
 81.   Joan Goldfrank, Guidance to Client Agencies on Compiling the Administrative Record, 48 
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN 7–9 (Feb. 2000) https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files 
/usao/legacy/2006/06/30/usab4801.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS7F-XYMP] (identifying “general princi-
ples” of record compilation, which include suggestions that the agency include “policies, guidelines, 
directives, and manuals” and “all draft documents that were circulated for comment either outside 
the agency or outside the author’s immediate office, if changes in these documents reflect significant 
input into the decision-making process.”). 
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this realm.  This Department of Justice guidance is directed toward other 
agencies which the Department represents in federal litigation. 
Reflecting the centrality of judicial review to agency operations, 
agencies—from the Environmental Protection Agency82 to the Depart-
ment of Defense83—have released memoranda to their employees offer-
ing suggestions on what should be preserved for the administrative rec-
ord, either as the minimum required by law or, as a best practice, enough 
material to move beyond such minimums when they are hazy.  This 
guidance helps sensitize employees to what confidential information they 
should fairly omit or redact.84 
D. The History of Judicial Review of Agency Action 
The text of the APA’s “whole record” requirement, and the context 
of how agencies statutorily must undertake their actions, provides only 
the starting point for realizing the precise contours of the requirement.  
The complete meaning of that phrase is illuminated by the history of 
American administrative review and by the history of the APA in partic-
ular.  Federal courts have a long tradition, predating the APA, of review-
ing administrative records to assess the lawfulness of agency action.  At 
the inception of the Republic, judicial review of agency action was not 
                                                            
 82.   U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVISED GUIDANCE ON COMPILING ADMINISTRATIVE REC-
ORDS FOR CERCLA RESPONSE ACTIONS 21–22 (Sept. 20, 2010), https://www.epa.gov/ 
sites/production/files/2013-11/documents/admin-record-mem-rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/53FQ-P9J3] 
(suggesting, for example, that copies of statutes and regulations should not be included in the record 
if they are publicly available but should be if they are not easily accessible); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, Final Guidance on Administrative Records for Selecting CERCLA Response Actions (Dec. 
3, 1990), https://semspub.epa.gov/work/06/9335428.pdf [https://perma.cc/935Q-WXMG]; see also 
In re United States Dep’t of Def. & United States Envtl. Prot. Agency Final Rule, No. 15-3751, 2016 
WL 5845712, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 4, 2016) (assessing a challenge to what materials properly belong 
in the record under the EPA’s own internal guidance for what belongs in the administrative record). 
 83.   U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ESA IMPLEMENTATION: ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD, 
http://www.dodworkshops.org/Module_5_Administrative_Record_SMR_FINAL.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/9QZQ-F2NP] (last visited Oct. 12, 2018); see also, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR supra note 
78 (suggesting that the administrative record should “[c]ontain the complete ‘story’ of the agency 
decision-making process, including options considered and rejected by the agency”); NAT’L OCEAN-
IC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION GUIDE-
LINES FOR COMPILING AN ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.gc.noaa 
.gov/documents/2012/AR_Guidelines_122112-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8GR-WH9D]. 
 84.   Because “the tradition that litigation is open to the public is of very long standing,” Union 
Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2000), courts have been critical of administra-
tive records that are over-redacted.  See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 
F.2d 1165, 1176 (6th Cir. 1983) (reversing district court opinion ordering the administrative record 
to be sealed, because it “erred by failing to state findings or conclusions which justify nondisclosure 
to the public”); id. at 1180 (“We decline to carve out an exception to the right of access in order to 
protect the secrecy of an administrative record.”). 
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consistently available because of sovereign immunity.85  An individual 
aggrieved by agency action had a few options, each with its own limita-
tions.  He or she could sue the executive official in the official’s individ-
ual capacity on a theory that the official was acting ultra vires, as hap-
pened in Marbury v. Madison.86  A person could bring an equitable 
action to obtain an injunction against an agency.87  An individual could 
also sue the agency under state tort law.88  Although Congress had previ-
ously waived sovereign immunity in some narrow contexts, not until the 
APA was much more government action—particularly non-ultra vires 
government action—made reviewable by the judiciary.89 
And throughout American history, people have had agencies to sue.  
Congress created the first federal agency, the Department of Foreign Af-
fairs, in 1789.90  Other executive departments, such as the Department of 
the Treasury,91 followed not long after.  But agencies did not begin to 
proliferate until around the Civil War.  In the mid-nineteenth century, 
Congress created one of the first regulatory agencies in response to fatal 
steamboat explosions.92  That body, the Board of Supervising Inspectors, 
                                                            
 85.   See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (“When the Constitution was ratified, it was 
well established in English law that the Crown could not be sued without consent in its own 
courts.”).  Thus, federal courts lacked jurisdiction over a particular claim unless Congress waived the 
federal government’s sovereign immunity as to that claim.  United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 
538 (1980). 
 86.   Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 151–52 (1803); Silvia L. Serpe, Note, Re-
viewability of Environmental Impact Statements on Legislative Proposals after Franklin v. Massa-
chusetts, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 413, 437 (1995) (“As early as Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme 
Court established that an aggrieved party could seek remedy through a writ of mandamus to compel 
compliance with statutory mandates.”) (citation omitted). 
 87.   John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 122 
& n.42 (1998) (citing Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 170–71 (1893)).  This was 
possible because “[a]t that time, federal equity law was judge-made.”  Id. at 121–22.  “[Noble], how-
ever, was less significant because the Court relied on its mandamus precedents, which permitted a 
court to order performance of only ministerial duties.”  Id. at 122 n.42.  
 88.   Id. at 122 & n.43 (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)) (reviewing a challenge 
to agency action based on common-law ejectment). 
 89.   Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1612, 1622–37 (1997); Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sover-
eign Immunity and Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 616–17 
(2003). 
 90.   An Act for Establishing an Executive Department, to Be Denominated the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 28, 28–29 (1789) (“There shall be an [e]xecutive department, to be 
denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs . . .”).  The name was later changed to the Depart-
ment of State.  An Act to Provide for the Safe-Keeping of the Acts, Records and Seal of the United 
States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 14, § 1, 1 Stat. 68, 68 (Sept. 15, 1789). 
 91.   An Act to Establish The Treasury Department, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 65, 65 (1780) (“[T]here 
shall be a Department of Treasury . . . .”). 
 92.   Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jack-
son to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1630 (2008). 
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had the power to make rules regarding boilers and boiler operators.93 
The most well-known of the late-nineteenth-century agencies is the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, created in 1887.  Its organic statute, 
the Commerce Act, provided for comparatively robust judicial review of 
factual findings.94  This tight control of agency action given by Congress 
to the courts became common during the late nineteenth century, as more 
agencies were created through statutes permitting de novo reconsidera-
tion of agency action.95 
In March 1896, in what appears to be the first Supreme Court opin-
ion to mention the scope of the administrative record on judicial review, 
the Court implied a note of caution about this congressionally-created re-
lationship between courts and agencies.96  The Court observed how peti-
tioners could obstruct an agency’s mission by “withhold[ing] the larger 
part of their evidence from the commission, and first adduc[ing] it in the 
circuit court.”97  This passage, however, does not really reveal early judi-
cial attitudes about administrative record  review.  The language was dic-
ta, as this case was not focused on the administrative record, and the 
Court declined in the opinion to create a generally applicable APA-like 
record rule.98  It is also difficult to say whether the Court’s observations 
applied to agencies generally or the Interstate Commerce Commission 
specifically.  The Court noted the limited powers possessed by that agen-
cy; for example, the agency’s factual findings were only “regarded as 
prima facie evidence.”99  In short, what the courts were doing may have 
                                                            
 93.   Id. at 1637–43 (2008) (citing the Steamboat Act of 1852, ch. 106, 10 Stat. 61).  In the five 
years after the Act’s passage, “deaths had fallen by a factor of five,” a total of 1,226 lives.  Id. at 
1659.  
 94.   Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 16, 24 Stat. 379, 384–85 (If a common carrier 
violates the Act or disobeys an order of the Commissioner, the Commission or an aggrieved party 
may “apply, in a summary way, by petition, to the circuit court of the United States sitting in equity” 
which “shall have power to hear and determine the matter; . . . on such hearing the report of said 
Commission shall be prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated . . .”). 
 95.   Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 
1194, 1210–11 (1986) (citing Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minn. ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse 
Comm’n, 134 U.S. 418 (1889)) (engaging in de novo review of the reasonableness of railroad rates 
established by the Interstate Commerce Commission). 
 96.   Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 162 U.S. 
184, 196 (1896) (deeming this case a “proper occasion to express disapproval” of the petitioners’ 
method of creating a fuller record in the courts than before the agency). 
 97.   Id. 
 98.   Id. (“We do not mean, of course, that either party, in a trial in the court, is to be restricted 
to the evidence that was before the commission . . . .”). 
 99.   Id.  This same point applies to the very first case reviewing an ICC order, from a circuit 
court seven years earlier.  Ky. & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 37 F. 567, 613 (C.C.D. Ky. 
1889) (“[The ICC] is neither a federal court under the constitution, nor does it exercise judicial pow-
ers, nor do its conclusions possess the efficacy of judicial proceedings.”). 
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been more tied to the organic statutes than any particular philosophy on 
record review of agency action. 
After the New Deal era, the judicial-scrutiny pendulum swung the 
other way.  By 1930, Congress had created about two-thirds of the feder-
al agencies that exist today.100  The courts began giving agency actions 
“considerable finality, and especially with respect to fact finding,” as a 
measure of judicial restraint and in practical recognition of the difficulty 
in giving searching review to the multiplying number of agencies and the 
multiplying number and types of tasks they were performing.101  The 
Court’s first recognition of the record rule, around this time in 1930, ex-
pressed respect for the efficiencies and comparative advantages of the 
agency whose action was under review, again the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.102  The result was “a strongly deferential model of re-
view.”103 
To ensure the fairness of the administrative state, the Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Administration, Congress, and some scholars began investi-
gating how to streamline and improve how agencies operate.104  By 1933, 
the American Bar Association suggested legislation that would have re-
turned to the model of more scrutinizing judicial review, with which 
many other contemporary proposals generally agreed.105  President Roo-
                                                            
 100.   Gavoor & Miktus, supra note 36, at 765. 
 101.   Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36–37 (1950), superseded by statute, Supple-
mental Appropriation Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 81-843, 64 Stat. 1044, 1048, as recognized in Ar-
destani v. I.N.S., 502 U.S. 129, 133 (1991). 
 102.   As the Supreme Court wrote: 
A proceeding under section 316 of the Packers and Stockyards Act is a judicial review, 
not a trial de novo. The validity of an order of the Secretary, like that of an order of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, must be determined upon the record of the proceed-
ings before him—save as there may be an exception of issues presenting claims of consti-
tutional right, a matter which need not be considered or decided now. . . . To allow his 
findings to be attacked or supported in court by new evidence would substitute the court 
for the administrative tribunal as the rate making body. Where it is believed that the Sec-
retary erred in his findings because important evidence was not brought to his attention, 
the appropriate remedy is to apply for a rehearing before him or to institute new proceed-
ings. He has the power and the duty to modify his order, if new evidence warrants the 
change. 
Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 443–45 (1930). 
 103.   Rabin, supra note 95, at 1194. 
 104.   See McGrath, 339 U.S. at 37–38 (citing S. 5154, 70th Cong. (2d Sess. 1929)); John Yoo, 
Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 205, 228–31 (2018); Rabin, supra 
note 95, at 1265.  See generally Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Begin-
nings, 72 VA. L. REV. 219 (1986) (recounting the origins of the APA). 
 105.   As one scholar described it: 
During the Roosevelt Administration, many, including the American Bar Association, 
forcefully resisted increased agency reliance on informal decisionmaking processes, such 
as rulemaking, favoring instead formal adjudication processes.  In fact, in 1940 the Act’s 
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sevelt asked the Attorney General to form a committee “to review the en-
tire administrative process in the various departments of the executive 
Government and to recommend improvements, including the suggestion 
of any needed legislation.”106  With the help of that committee, after 
World War II, Congress decided to pass administrative reform with less 
searching judicial review of agency action.107  Although an early itera-
tion, the Walter-Logan Bill, was vetoed, the Administrative Procedure 
Act finally passed Congress without opposition and was signed by Presi-
dent Truman on June 11, 1946.108 
E. The Administrative Procedure Act 
The APA was designed “to introduce greater uniformity of procedure 
and standardization of administrative practice among the diverse agen-
cies whose customs had departed widely from each other.”109  With the 
APA, Congress established procedures by which the executive branch 
agencies conduct their business—and created a key check on final agen-
cy action, unreasonably delayed action, and agency inaction, in the form 
of judicial review broader than what had been historically available.  The 
APA makes agency actions presumptively reviewable, a departure from 
the earlier era in which it was much more difficult for individuals to ob-
tain redress for agency wrongs.110  Agency action now is unreviewable 
only if Congress has precluded review by statute or by conferral of dis-
cretion.111 
                                                            
main competitor, the Walter-Logan Bill, which provided for the elimination of agencies’ 
informal rulemaking powers and required instead court-centered adjudication, passed 
both houses of Congress, only to be vetoed by a president who deemed the bill to be the 
work of lawyers “who desire to have all processes of government conducted through law-
suits.”  Eventually, the APA passed both the Senate and the House without a single vote 
against it in either chamber.  Congress then designated the Attorney General’s report as 
the Act’s official legislative history.  That report had set the stage for the passage of the 
Act by explaining the problems associated with agencies’ decisionmaking procedures as 
of that time, making recommendations for a comprehensive and uniform approach to 
agency decisionmaking, and explaining how such an approach would remedy existing 
ills—almost serving as the Act’s Federalist, one might say. 
Steven P. Croley, The Administrative Procedure Act and Regulatory Reform: A Reconciliation, 10 
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 35, 38–39 (1996) (footnotes omitted). 
 106.   McGrath, 339 U.S. at 38–39. 
 107.   Gavoor & Miktus, supra note 36, at 766–67.  
 108.   McGrath, 339 U.S. at 39–40. 
 109.   Id. at 41. 
 110.   Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967); see Gardner v. Toilet Goods 
Ass’n, 387 U.S. 167, 168 (1967); cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985) (discussing 
discretionary action as an exception to the presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action). 
 111.   5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
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Relevant here, the APA created a record rule, which limits judicial 
review to the administrative record before the agency when it made its 
decision.  Congress did not explicitly pronounce this rule when it passed 
the APA, but the record rule derives from several sound sources.  Section 
10(e) of the APA, now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706, sets the textual lode-
star for the record rule: “the court shall review the whole record or those 
parts of it cited by a party.”112  Though indirect, 5 U.S.C. § 706 implies 
both a maximum of what will be reviewed—”the whole record”—and a 
minimum—”those parts of it cited by a party.”113  The phrase “the whole 
record” is also used in reference to setting aside agency “action, findings, 
and conclusions,” which implies the record is created and used by the 
agency and is the basis for its action, findings, or conclusions.114  Read in 
conjunction with the APA provisions that enumerate specific procedures 
that would generate contents of the record, and with similar organic stat-
utes, “the whole record” appears to incorporate those materials.115  Im-
portantly, although the record rule arises from 5 U.S.C. § 706, it is sepa-
rate from the merits standards found in that same section, which appear 
in enumerated paragraphs preceding the record rule’s flush text. 
The APA’s legislative history, though inconclusive, lends further 
support to this reading.  The legislative history of the APA is found 
largely in the Senate Judiciary Committee Report and, to the extent it is 
consistent with that report, in the Attorney General’s Manual on the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.116  Both documents have been found to be 
authoritative sources on the APA’s meaning by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.117  Neither those sources nor other sources of legislative history, 
                                                            
 112.   5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 113.   Id.  The Solicitor General of the United States has acknowledged that “[t]he ‘whole rec-
ord’ provision thus does not speak to what materials that an agency must include in the record in the 
first place . . . .”  Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 3, In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017) (No. 
17-801). 
 114.   5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 
 115.   See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–557; Brian S. Prestes, Remanding Without Vacating Agency Action, 
32 SETON HALL L. REV. 108, 126 n.120 (2001) (suggesting the agency statement of basis and pur-
pose mandated for rulemaking by 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) belongs in “the whole record”). 
 116.   See S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945); ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 40. 
 117.   The Senate Judiciary Committee Report is authoritative to the extent that it does not vary 
from the APA, and Attorney General’s Manual on the APA.  See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 
281, 302 n.31 (1979) (citing the Senate Report as an “authoritative source[]” in interpreting the 
APA); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978).  
The Attorney General’s Manual on the APA is authoritative to the extent it does not vary with the 
APA or the Senate Judiciary Committee Report.  Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 302 n.31 (“In prior 
cases, we have given some weight to the Attorney General’s Manual . . . since the Justice Depart-
ment was heavily involved in the legislative process that resulted in the Act’s enactment in 1946.”); 
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]e have 
repeatedly given great weight” to “the Government’s own most authoritative interpretation of the 
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unfortunately, expound the term “the whole record,”118 excepting a 
statement in the Senate Judiciary Committee Report that “[t]he require-
ment of review upon ‘the whole record’ means that courts may not look 
only to the case presented by one party, since other evidence may weak-
en or even indisputably destroy that case.”119  Otherwise, regarding the 5 
U.S.C. § 706 tailpiece containing the phrase “whole record,” the Attor-
ney General’s Manual simply says that “[t]he provisions of section [706] 
constitute a general restatement of the principles of judicial review em-
bodied in many statutes and judicial decisions.”120  Given the various and 
agency-specific attitudes toward administrative records that predated the 
APA, these statements provide little help in ascertaining what the APA 
demands of agencies for judicial review. 
The APA’s drafters may have addressed the issue so briefly because 
when Congress enacted the APA in 1946, the requirements for standing 
were stricter.121  Congress may not have anticipated the volume of pri-
vate litigants that would invoke the APA to sue federal agencies, or have 
predicted that informal adjudication in particular—a category of agency 
action for which the APA does not outline record-generating proce-
dures—would be so popular.  But more importantly, the APA was inten-
tionally not comprehensive.  The APA’s stated purpose was to be “a bill 
of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are 
controlled or regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal 
Government.”122  Among other advantages, this breathing room helps al-
                                                            
APA, the 1947 Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act[.]”). 
 118.   BECK, supra note 35, at 2. 
 119.   S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 214. 
 120.   ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 41, at 93; see id. at 138 (stating that 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706 “declares the existing law concerning the scope of judicial review”). 
 121.   See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1432, 1434–47 (1988) (“[T]he Court [in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)] moved dramatically in the direction of a standing doctrine that no long-
er owed its shape to common-law categories, or distinguished between the rights of regulated entities 
and regulatory beneficiaries.”); Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park’s Require-
ment of Judicial Review “On the Record”, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179, 201 n.81 (1996) (“It was not 
until [Data Processing] that the APA was read as presuming that anyone whose interest was argua-
bly among the zone of interests specially protected by a statute would have standing to sue.” (cita-
tions omitted)). 
 122.   S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 298 (1946) (emphasis added), cited in, e.g., Diebold v. United 
States, 947 F.2d 787, 795 (6th Cir. 1991); see also S. DOC. NO. 248 at 304 (“[The APA bill] is not a 
codification of administrative law. It represents, instead, an outline of minimum basic essentials, 
framed out of long consideration . . . .”); Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Cir-
cuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 363 (1978) (“[I]n 1973, with the Florida East 
Coast case, it became obvious even to the obtuse[] that the Supreme Court regarded the APA as a 
sort of superstatute, or subconstitution, in the field of administrative process: a basic framework that 
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leviate constitutional concerns.123  So even if Congress did foresee issues 
defining “the whole record,” it may have intended to leave the term in-
distinct for the courts to refine and apply.124 
F. Supreme Court Treatment of the Record Rule 
The capacious words “the whole record” have not been circum-
scribed by the U.S. Supreme Court, which has given this issue only indi-
rect and muddled treatment.  The seminal Supreme Court treatment of 
the record rule is arguably 1971’s Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. 
Volpe.125  There, citizens of Memphis sued the Secretary of Transporta-
tion, challenging his decision to build an interstate highway through a 
park.126  The only evidence in the judicial record that supported the Sec-
retary’s decision was affidavits that he submitted after litigation com-
menced.127  The Court held that this was insufficient, as a contemporane-
ous record is necessary to evaluate the propriety of the agency’s 
actions.128  The Court remanded to the district court to discern the Secre-
tary’s reasoning at the time, through the consideration of either contem-
poraneous documents or documents created after the fact that shed light 
on the decision-making process at the time.129  The Court encouraged the 
lower courts to further remand to the agency to produce an acceptable 
record, but suggested the lower courts could, if truly necessary, fact-find 
themselves.130 
Overton Park offers a few lessons on the record rule, although they 
                                                            
was not lightly to be supplanted or embellished, not even by other legislative enactments, much less 
by a continually evolving judge-made common law not based upon constitutional prescriptions or 
rooted in the language of the APA itself.”); Croley, supra note 105 (likening the APA to a founda-
tional document like the Constitution, the meaning and scope of which evolve over time). 
 123.   See, e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 799 (1992); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542 (1978) (suggesting that in quasi-judicial 
rulemaking determinations featuring a “very small number of persons” who are “exceptionally af-
fected,” additional procedures may be needed to satisfy due process). 
 124.   See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1039, 1039 (1997) (“The [APA] is a framework statute, not a complete code. Its central provi-
sions are rather sparse, and a number of important questions are not covered at all.  It comes as no 
surprise, therefore, that the judicial gloss on the APA has taken on a large significance over time.”). 
 125.   401 U.S. 402 (1971), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 
(1977). 
 126.   Id. at 406. 
 127.   Id. at 409. 
 128.   Id. (“We agree that formal findings were not required. But we do not believe that in this 
case judicial review based solely on litigation affidavits was adequate.”). 
 129.   Id. at 420. 
 130.   Id.  
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are complicated by conclusory and unelaborated dicta.131  Justice Thur-
good Marshall’s opinion declared a need for “the full administrative rec-
ord that was before the [agency] at the time [it] made [its] decision.”132  
The decision emphasized that unless required by the APA or another 
statute, however, formal findings were unnecessary.133  The “full admin-
istrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his de-
cision,” and only that record, is what could be reviewed.134  However, the 
Court created an exception to that rule that was neither presented by the 
facts of the case nor briefed by the parties.135  The Court stated that a pe-
titioner can avoid the record rule’s limitations upon a “strong showing of 
bad faith or improper behavior,” though the Court did not explain what 
would rise to that level.136 
The Court ruled against the Secretary of Transportation because the 
“bare record” he presented obstructed judicial review.137  By remanding 
for an examination of what the record should be, the Court cast the prob-
lem as a record problem, not a merits problem.  The opinion, in announc-
ing its remedy, permitted certain traditional civil discovery to fill gaps, 
but admonished that the preferred approach is to remand further to the 
agency for an explanation. 
Some literature has criticized Overton Park for being inconsistent 
with the APA.138  Notwithstanding, Overton Park remains good, if some-
times cryptic, law.  Two years later, the Supreme Court in Camp v. Pitts 
reiterated that “the focal point for judicial review should be the adminis-
trative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in 
                                                            
 131.   See, e.g., In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371, 373–74 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
grant of stay) (arguing that when Overton Park stated that it would accept the record presented by 
the agency, it really meant the record presented by the agency proceedings, thus the court, not the 
agency, was the ultimate arbiter of the record’s contents), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 44, 
rev’g 875 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 132.   Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420. 
 133.   Id. at 417. 
 134.   Id. at 420. 
 135.   See id.; Brief for Petitioners at 28, Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402 (No. 1066); Brief for Re-
spondents at 28, Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402 (No. 1066) (raising the idea and citing lower-court case 
law but emphasizing that “there has been no suggestion by petitioners in this case that [the deci-
sionmakers] acted in bad faith, or as a result of political pressure, or because of some other improper 
or illegal reason prejudicial to petitioners”); Reply Brief for Petitioners, Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402 
(No. 1066) (not addressing the topic). 
 136.   Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420. 
 137.   Id. 
 138.   E.g., Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations 
and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Stat-
utes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 767–68 (1975) (arguing that the Overton Park outcome was a “distor-
tion[] of the original meaning of the APA”). 
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the reviewing court.”139  Camp spoke to the remedy for a record-rule vio-
lation: if there was no “contemporaneous explanation of the agency deci-
sion,” then the courts should remand to the agency.140 
The Supreme Court indirectly addressed the record rule in Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., holding that courts cannot add to the procedures set by the APA, the 
organic statute, and the Constitution.141  The Court emphasized that 
agencies need flexibility to “permit[] them to discharge their multitudi-
nous duties.”142  Thus, courts cannot impose their own notion of what are 
the best ways for agencies to execute their missions. 
The Court returned to the remedy issue in 1985 in Florida Power & 
Light Co. v. Lorion, where it emphasized that if the agency’s action is 
unsupported by the record, then the remedy is remand to the agency “ex-
cept in rare circumstances.”143  The Court did not give an example of 
such a circumstance.  Lorion reeled back Overton Park’s implication that 
where the record is nonexistent or incomplete, the necessary and proper 
remedy is factfinding in the district court: “The task of the reviewing 
court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706, 
to the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the re-
viewing court.”144  This is because “agencies typically compile records in 
the course of informal agency action,” and the “APA specifically con-
templates judicial review on the basis of the agency record compiled in 
the course of informal agency action in which a hearing has not oc-
curred.”145  Lorion referenced, but did not apply, the Overton Park “bare 
record” reasoning, stating that a court could set aside agency action “if 
the agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if the reviewing 
court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of 
the record before it.”146 
                                                            
 139.   411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).  Like Overton Park, however, Camp did not comprehensively 
resolve the scope of the APA record, and so its brief treatment of the topic admits of some ambigui-
ty.  See, e.g., Susannah T. French, Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA Litigation, 
81 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 944 (1993) (“Overton Park requires that a court’s review be ‘based on,’ not 
limited to, the record before the agency.”). 
 140.   See Camp, 411 U.S. at 143. 
 141.   Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 
(1978). 
 142.   Id. at 543. 
 143.   470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). 
 144.   Id. at 743–44. 
 145.   Id. at 744. 
 146.   Id.; see also French, supra note 139 (summarizing Vermont Yankee and Lorion as “re-
flect[ing] a clear, if not very well-developed, preference for limiting judicial review to the agency 
record, regardless of the formality of the administrative proceedings”). 
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In June 1990’s Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., the 
Court extended to informal adjudication Vermont Yankee’s prohibition 
on judicially imposing procedural requirements not derived from statute 
or the Constitution.147  LTV explained that the Overton Park record rule 
was fairly derived from the APA and so did not violate Vermont Yan-
kee.148 
In the nearly thirty years since LTV, the Supreme Court has not de-
cided a case directly addressing the record rule.  It touched on the issue 
in late 2017 when several states and organizations sued the Department 
of Homeland Security for deciding to end the Deferred Action for Child-
hood Arrivals (DACA) program, which generally deprioritized immigra-
tion enforcement against aliens who came to the United States unlawful-
ly as youths.149  Federal district judges in the Northern District of 
California150 and the Eastern District of New York151 ordered the Secre-
tary of Homeland Security to produce documents and to sit for deposi-
tions beyond what she had identified as the administrative record. 
To head off what the government viewed as very invasive and bur-
densome discovery that had already led to the production of 1.2 million 
documents from more than 100 custodians,152 the Secretary petitioned the 
Second and Ninth Circuits for writs of mandamus.153  When the Ninth 
Circuit denied the writ, the Secretary petitioned the Supreme Court for 
one and moved to stay the district court’s order.154  In a case captioned In 
re United States, the Supreme Court granted the stay in a 5-4 decision 
that drew a dissent arguing that the district judge properly ordered com-
pletion of the administrative record.155  Just a week later, the Supreme 
Court granted the writ, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the Ninth 
Circuit to remand to the district court.156  The Supreme Court’s unani-
                                                            
 147.   See 496 U.S. 633 (1990). 
 148.   Id. at 654. 
 149.   In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1207 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 443, 444. 
 150.   Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211, 2017 WL 
4642324, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017). 
 151.   Batalla Vidal v. Duke, No. 16-CV-4756, 2017 WL 4737280, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 
2017). 
 152.   Petition For Writ of Mandamus at 12, In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(No. 17-72917), ECF No. 1–2. 
 153.   In re Nielsen, No. 17-3345, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 26821, at *8 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2017); 
In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 154.   Petition For a Writ of Mandamus, In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017) (No. 17-801), 
2017 WL 6018231; Application for a Stay Pending Disposition of a Petition For a Writ of Manda-
mus, In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371 (2017). 
 155.   138 S. Ct. 371, 371. 
 156.   In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443, 445 (2017). 
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mous per curiam opinion granted the writ only because it believed the 
district judge erroneously picked up the APA record issues before ad-
dressing the Secretary’s threshold jurisdictional arguments.157  As quick-
ly as the issue shot up to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court sent it 
back down without any new guidance to the bench and bar on the scope 
of the record rule.158  The only firm impression left by the Court’s opin-
ion was that disputes over the contents of the administrative record can 
be sufficiently important and burdensome that lower courts should be 
leery of uncritically ordering contested record production. 
It is possible that the Supreme Court may revisit the issue.  In Octo-
ber 2018, the Court in In re Department of Commerce stayed a district 
court order permitting APA petitioners to depose the Secretary of Com-
merce about his reasoning for including a citizenship question on the 
next decennial census.159  The Secretary had pressed that his deposition 
constituted evidence beyond what belonged in the APA record.160  The 
Court gave no reasoning for issuing its stay, but left open the possibility 
that the Secretary could petition for a writ of certiorari and receive a de-
cision on the merits of the record scope.161 
III.  HOW THE APA RECORD RULE SHOULD BE INTERPRETED IN 
PRACTICE 
With these background principles, we can discern what, precisely, 
“the whole record” means for APA judicial review.  A court must look 
only at the agency record—”or those parts of it cited by a party”162—
which is all materials compiled by the agency that were before the agen-
cy at the time the decision was made and considered by the agency.163  
Thus, a court cannot order traditional civil discovery.164  Discovery may 
                                                            
 157.   Id. 
 158.   Id. 
 159.   In re Dep’t of Commerce, No. 18A375, 2018 WL 5259090, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2018) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the underlying factual dispute). 
 160.   Id. 
 161.   Id. at *1–2. 
 162.   5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 163.   Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 
743–44 (1985). 
 164.   Because “the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in 
existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court,” Camp, 411 U.S. at 142, 
“[t]here is a strong presumption against discovery into administrative proceedings born out of the 
objective of preserving the integrity and independence of the administrative process.”  NVE, Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 436 F.3d 182, 195 (3d Cir. 2006); accord USA Grp. Loan Servs. 
v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) (“Discovery is rarely proper in the judicial 
review of administration action.”); Int’l Jr. Coll. Of Bus. & Tech., Inc. v. Duncan, 937 F. Supp. 2d 
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perhaps continue to be appropriate on non-merits threshold issues, such 
as jurisdictional discovery to determine standing, irreparable harm in the 
preliminary injunction context, or the like.  Otherwise, an APA petitioner 
should not be allowed to serve interrogatories on an agency or notice the 
agency head for depositions.  If a court concludes that the agency needs 
to add documents to the administrative record, an appropriate and com-
mon remedy is to remand to the agency for further proceedings.165 
At most, the court should permit the parties to “complete” a record in 
appropriate circumstances, without obtaining discovery to do so.  A court 
should not permit the parties, as has become the norm, to go beyond the 
administrative record by “adding to,” “augmenting,” or “supplementing” 
the agency record beyond the APA “whole record” (absent mutual con-
sent of the parties).  A full exploration of these concepts lays bare why 
completion is consistent with the APA and administrative judicial review 
whereas supplementation is not.  This divergence is also wrapped up in 
the common conflation by judges and advocates alike of records issues 
with merits issues. 
A. How a Limited Completion Interpretation of “the Whole Record” 
Comports with the APA 
A narrow reading of “the whole record” follows from examining the 
rest of the APA, the Supreme Court’s general administrative caselaw, the 
APA’s legislative history, and the similarity of APA record review to or-
dinary appellate review.  First, the APA’s structure and purpose demon-
strates that “the whole record” should be strictly limited to the materials 
that the agency decisionmaker considered.  Except for unreasonable de-
                                                            
202, 204–05 (D.P.R. 2012) (“[T]he narrowness of the APA action for judicial review weighs heavily 
against discovery[.]”), aff’d, 802 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2015).  By “discovery,” we mean simply the phase 
of litigation wherein the parties exchange information pursuant to court rules before trial—which 
encompasses both the supplementation of the APA record as well as traditional discovery.  Our defi-
nition excludes, however, instances in which the agency produces documents on its own, either on 
its own initiative or by court order, that do not undergo the discovery process. 
  Some circuits nevertheless permit discovery, for example “in cases involving alleged bias 
on the part of the agency.” NVE, 436 F.3d at 195 (citing Hummel v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 
1984)) (permitting discovery on the issue of an ALJ’s bias); Rochling v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 
725 F.3d 927, 936 (8th Cir. 2013) (permitting discovery on a strong showing of bad faith or improp-
er behavior).  See also generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (exempting suits for review of agency action 
from many of the discovery requirements).  This requirement also prevents litigants from circum-
venting principles of exhaustion, by seeking, receiving, and challenging evidence in the first instance 
in the federal court.  See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492, 499–500 
(1955) (“Section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act does not require a different result. That 
Act purports to strengthen, rather than to weaken, the principle requiring the exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies before permitting court review.”). 
 165.   E.g., Brodsky v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 704 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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lay cases,166 APA judicial review is reserved for when the agency is fin-
ished either acting or not acting.167  A petitioner can challenge only a fi-
nal agency action,168 which suggests that the agency record, at the time 
of judicial review, is complete.169  This is part of why, under the APA, 
“[r]eviews of agency action in the district courts must be processed as 
appeals.”170 
Moreover, APA review is narrow and deferential,171 which is con-
sistent with a cabined record on review.  For one, the petitioner has the 
burden of proof in an APA action.172  And the APA extends deference to 
agencies consistent with Congressional intent.  Deference to agencies is 
evidenced by: the language of the APA, which directs courts to uphold 
many aspects of agency action even if the courts carry differing opinions 
of the wisdom of those actions;173 the fact that agencies have more spe-
cialized experience than do generalist district courts;174 the fact that con-
stitutionally speaking, agencies—which are helmed by officers of the 
United States who can be removed and indirectly checked by the politi-
cal process, unlike life-tenured Article III judges—are better positioned 
than courts to make policy choices;175 and the broad investigative powers 
                                                            
 166.   5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 
 167.   See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 701(b)(2), 706.  
 168.   5 U.S.C. § 704; see Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997). 
 169.   Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). 
 170.   Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1579–80 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 171.   See 5 U.S.C. § 706; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 172.   E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 702 F.3d 1156, 1165 (10th Cir. 2012); Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 619 (7th Cir. 
1995). 
 173.   5 U.S.C. § 706 (listing how the courts will defer to the agencies); e.g., Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
 174.   In re Sang Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The foundation of the principle 
of judicial deference to the rulings of agency tribunals is that the tribunal has specialized knowledge 
and expertise, such that when reasoned findings are made, a reviewing court may confidently defer 
to the agency’s application of its knowledge in its area of expertise.”); cf. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. 
Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 87, 92–93 (1968) (cautioning in an APA case against let-
ting “[t]he requirement for administrative decisions based on substantial evidence and reasoned find-
ings . . . become lost in the haze of so-called expertise”); Stephen M. DeGenaro, Note, Why Should 
We Care About an Agency’s Special Insight?, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 919 (2013) (“Whereas 
federal agencies may be devoted to a special field (e.g., the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration and workplace safety), federal dockets contain a diverse array of cases—often in onerous 
quantities.”). 
 175.   Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (“[F]ederal 
judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those 
who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the 
struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones.”); Harold M. Green-
berg, Why Agency Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes Should Be Subject to Stare Decisis, 79 
TENN. L. REV. 573, 590 (2012) (“Agency policy choices are not incidental and undesirable byprod-
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that agencies can have and which courts lack.176  This deference suggests 
that courts should take only the record before the agency and not consid-
er other evidence not before the agency, which could cast the agency’s 
decision in an unfavorable light. 
Interpreting “the whole record” to mean all materials upon which the 
agency directly relied is also consistent with an influential Supreme 
Court case, SEC v. Chenery, Corp. (“Chenery I”), which predated the 
APA by three years and held that an agency may not defend an adminis-
trative decision on new grounds not set forth by the agency in its original 
decision.177  A strict record rule is a corollary to the Chenery I rule; by 
cutting off courts’ inquiry at materials created contemporaneously with 
the decision making process, courts prevent agencies from slipping in 
post hoc rationalizations for the actions they took.  The Chenery I doc-
trine is defensible in the APA context.  For example, in Overton Park, 
two former and current Secretaries of Transportation rushed to prepare 
affidavits, around the holidays, that the Solicitor General presented in 
and tried to file with the Supreme Court the day of the oral argument.178  
This “agency-reasoning-by-ambush” is but one reason to countenance 
the bar on post hoc rationalizations. 
Next, interpreting the APA to require only this simple “whole rec-
ord” comports with the Supreme Court’s Vermont Yankee doctrine pro-
hibiting courts from going beyond the APA to impose on agencies pro-
cedural requirements not found in the APA.179  One of those maximum 
requirements is in 5 U.S.C. § 706, which embodies a “general ‘procedur-
al’ requirement of sorts [that] mandat[es] that an agency take whatever 
                                                            
ucts of the institution’s task; they are the agencies’ very raison d’etre.”). 
 176.   See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944) (“But the Administrator’s policies 
are made in pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized experience and broader investi-
gations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case.”). 
 177.   318 U.S. 80, 94–95 (1943); accord Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Leavitt, 470 F.3d 71, 81 (2d 
Cir. 2006); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 178.   Jan. 11, 1971 Oral Argument at 2:38, Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (No. 1066), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/1066 [https://perma.cc/UD5A-3EX7] (“[COUNSEL FOR OVER-
TON PARK]: [A]pproximately 10 minutes ago[, ] the Solicitor General handed me two pieces of 
paper, which purport to be affidavits which I understand he is attempting to file in this case at this 
time, one of which says that as an affidavit of [Secretary] Alan S. Boyd and which he says as a mat-
ter of fact that he did make the determination which we have alleged he did not make and which we 
have offered to prove that he did not make.  The second piece of paper which he has filed purports to 
be an affidavit of [successor Secretary] John Volpe that he made determinations.”); Id. at 35:15 
(“[SOLICITOR GENERAL]: We recognize that the presentation of these documents is unusual. We 
submit them for what effect they can properly be given . . . We had them nicely printed up, but Sec-
retary Volpe has been out of town.  His affidavit was cleared with him by telephone.”). 
 179.   Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 
(1978). 
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steps it needs to provide an explanation that will enable the court to eval-
uate the agency’s rationale at the time of decision.”180 
Legislative history also provides some minimal support for our inter-
pretation of “the whole record.”  As recounted earlier, the APA intended 
to carry forward the prevailing interpretation of the scope of the adminis-
trative record subject to judicial review.181  By 1946, that view was rela-
tively pro-agency.  Moreover, some scholars point to APA legislative 
history182 to argue that all informal agency action was meant to be re-
viewed de novo under another section of the APA: 5 U.S.C. § 
706(2)(F).183  This argument contends that Overton Park and its record 
rule are thus unfaithful to the APA in the context of informal agency ac-
tion.  But the exclusion of de novo review from the final bill suggests 
that Congress in fact did not want the courts to have a heavy influence in 
what materials the agency would consider and which the court could 
consider on judicial review. 
 Further, the properly interpreted record rule finds a companion in 
the law, through a parallel doctrine regarding record treatment in appel-
late review.  Under that model, appellate courts reviewing the judgment 
of a district court review only the information that was presented in that 
tribunal.184  The reason has sound underpinnings.  It respects trial pro-
cesses for presenting, evaluating, and admitting evidence.185  It protects 
the fairness of the system to the parties.186  This model helps ensure accu-
racy through the advocacy of counsel and the evaluation of impartial 
judges and juries.187  It focuses appellate courts on their area of expertise, 
the resolution of questions of law, while recognizing the superior experi-
ence of trial courts in resolving questions of fact.188  These values are 
equally commendable in APA judicial review. 
However, even the appellate rule of reviewing a limited record is not 
impervious.  While the rule is exalted in sometimes moral terms,189 it too 
                                                            
 180.   Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990). 
 181.   See supra Section 0. 
 182.   H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 279–80 (1946); S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 213–14 (1945). 
 183.   Young, supra note 121, at 212 (citing Nathanson, supra note 138, at 763–65 & n.187). 
 184.   Jeffrey C. Dobbins, New Evidence on Appeal, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2016, 2020 (2012).  This 
manifested, for example, in Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 10 and 16. 
 185.   Id. at 2022. 
 186.   Id. 
 187.   Id. 
 188.   Id. at 2021. 
 189.   Id. (“In the normal situation, attempts to rely on nonrecord facts in appellate courts are 
‘unprofessional conduct.’”) (quoting Robert L. Stern, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 
§ 10.12, at 276 (2d ed. 1989)). 
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has been susceptible to common-law carveouts: for example, amicus 
briefs, Brandeis briefs, and legislative facts.190  And there are differences 
between an Article III appellate court reviewing the record of a lower Ar-
ticle III court as in a typical appeal, and an Article III district court re-
viewing the record of an Article I agency as in a typical APA case.191  
Nevertheless, Congress intended the APA to incorporate the traditional 
appellate model in its judicial-review provisions.192 
 Federal and local rules complement this concept.  Closest to the ap-
pellate model, unsurprisingly, are the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure.  Rule 16(a) provides a bare-bones definition of the “record on re-
view or enforcement of an agency order,” which consists of: “(1) the 
order involved; (2) any findings or report on which it is based; and (3) 
the pleadings, evidence, and other parts of the proceedings before the 
agency.”193  Rule 17(b) then requires the agency to file either the record 
or a certified index of the record.194  Other rules service this limited defi-
nition of the record less explicitly.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 
for example, excuses litigants from the obligation to make initial disclo-
sures if the case is founded on record review.195  Some courts’ local rules 
exempt such suits from needing a scheduling order.196  Some rules are 
more substantive, making clear that the judicial record is coextensive 
with the agency record.197 
Although this is the record rule as we interpret it through these var-
ied sources, it again should be emphasized that organic statutes may im-
pose different or additional requirements.198  In the absence of such stat-
utes, the record rule applies to judicial review of all types of agency 
action: formal adjudication, informal adjudication, formal rulemaking, 
legislative rulemaking, non-legislative rulemaking, sub-regulatory policy 
                                                            
 190.   Id. at 2017; see generally Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in 
the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 406 (1942). 
 191.   Dobbins, supra note 184, at 2027–28 (2012) (discussing the debate “regarding the proper 
role of administrative agencies,” the lack of clear definition in an administrative record, and separa-
tion of powers concerns). 
 192.   Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Re-
view Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 942–43 (2011) (“The appellate review 
model was fully entrenched before the onset of the New Deal and was later incorporated into the 
Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.”). 
 193.   FED. R. APP. P. 16(a). 
 194.   Id.  R. 17(b)(1)(B). 
 195.   FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B)(i). 
 196.   S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. CIV. R. 16.1. 
 197.   D. WYO. CIV. R. 83.6(b)(1).  But see id. R. 83.6(b)(3) (permitting “supplementation of the 
record” in certain limited circumstances, upon motion filed within 14 days after the record is filed). 
 198.   See supra note 68. 
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statements, and agency inaction.199 
B. The Proper Means to Ensure the Court Reviews the Whole Record: 
Completion 
When built upon that foundation, the properly interpreted record rule 
leads easily to practical application distinct from the tangled, inconsistent 
doctrines created by case law.  To ensure that the full administrative rec-
ord is before the court, a court should permit, and indeed require, parties 
to “complete” the record where appropriate.  By this, we mean to add 
documents that were properly part of the agency record but were not 
filed in court with that record.  This is doctrinally appropriate because 
completion simply enforces the record rule, making the agency put up 
the full set of materials it considered.  A party should not be able to use 
completion to propound discovery to find new records; completion 
should affect only what evidence the court considers.  This is consistent 
with the more circumscribed scope of judicial review settled on by Con-
gress when it passed the APA in 1946 after moving away from a more 
hands-off approach to judicial review but stopping well short of reestab-
lishing judicial dominance in policing agency actions.200  It is also con-
sistent with the appellate-style review with which APA judicial review 
shares many similarities.201 
Completion should proceed as follows.  For context, there is a 
longstanding presumption of agency regularity: “a presumption of hones-
ty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators. . . .”202  The presumption 
reinforces separation of powers, harmonizes with agency deference 
found in other contexts, and recognizes the practical reality that the 
agency has superior knowledge of what materials it considered.203  In 
APA cases that translates to a rebuttable presumption that the agency’s 
record is complete.204  An APA petitioner must rebut the presumption be-
                                                            
 199.   The APA “whole record” provision applies to challenges to “agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 
706(1)–(2).  The APA defines “agency action” broadly to “include[] the whole or a part of an agency 
rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act,” thus sug-
gesting the “whole record” requirement applies to the above types of agency functions.  See id. 
§§ 701(b)(2), 551(13). 
 200.   See supra Section II.D. 
 201.   See supra Section II.E. 
 202.   Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). 
 203.   James N. Saul, Overly Restrictive Administrative Records and the Frustration of Judicial 
Review, 38 ENVTL. L. 1301, 1312 (2008). 
 204.   Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) (citing United 
States v. Chem. Found., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)); Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d 98, 113 
(2d Cir. 2008) (“The plaintiffs argue that this principle of judicial review creates a risk that agencies 
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fore completion may occur.205 
There are few ways that APA petitioners should be able to rebut the 
presumption of agency regularity in the compilation and presentation of 
the administrative record.  First, a petitioner should be able to complete 
the record by adducing evidence demonstrating that the administrative 
record is not complete.  This happens where the agency “deliberately or 
negligently excluded documents that may have been adverse to its deci-
sion.”206  The doctrine has variable phrasing: where the agency “relied on 
documents or materials not included in the record,”207 or the agency 
failed to include materials “available” to it, that it should have “consid-
ered.”208 
This determination has many dimensions.  The size of the record 
may be relevant.209  If the record references other parts of the record that 
are not present, or the record contains reports that could not have been 
made without other information not in the record, then incompleteness is 
                                                            
will be able to hoodwink courts into accepting agencies’ self-interested justifications, but we are 
unwilling to ascribe such nefarious motives to agency action as a general matter.”); see generally 
Note, The Presumption of Regularity in Judicial Review of the Executive Branch, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
2431 (2018). 
 205.   See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416; Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 740 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (“[D]esignation of the Administrative Record, like any established administrative proce-
dure, is entitled to a presumption of administrative regularity. The court assumes the agency properly 
designated the Administrative Record absent clear evidence to the contrary.” (citing Wilson v. Ho-
del, 758 F.2d 1369, 1374 (10th Cir. 1985))); Univ. of Colo. Health at Mem’l Hosp. v. Burwell, 151 
F. Supp. 3d 1, 12–13 (D.D.C. 2015) (“The record that an agency produces ‘is entitled to a strong 
presumption of regularity.’” (quoting Marcum v. Salazar, 751 F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (D.D.C. 2010),).  
Many cases caution that the ultimate authority to decide what constitutes the administrative record 
lies with the judiciary.  E.g., Yuetter, 994 F.2d at 740. 
 206.   BECK, supra note 35, at 67; see also Fund for Animals v. Williams, 391 F.Supp. 2d 191, 
198 (D.D.C. 2005) (permitting supplementation “when an agency excludes information adverse to 
its position from the administrative record.  A plaintiff can make a prima facie showing that an 
agency excluded adverse information from the record by proving that the documents at issue (1) 
were known to the agency at the time it made its decision, (2) are directly related to the decision, and 
(3) are adverse to the agency’s decision.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 207.   Pub. Power Council v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Yuetter, 994 
F.2d at 739; Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1989); BECK, supra note 
35, at 67.  
 208.   Ad Hoc Metals Coal. v. Whitman, 227 F. Supp. 2d 134, 139–140,142 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 209.   NVE Inc. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 436 F.3d 182, 196 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he 
size of the record alone is not dispositive of the question of whether discovery is appropriate. Never-
theless, the size of the record is certainly a factor that a court should consider in deciding whether to 
take the unusual step of permitting invasive discovery into administrative decision-making.”).  Com-
pare, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 91 F.R.D. 26, 39 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (126-page record 
found to be incomplete on its face), with Pac. Shores Subdivision Cal. Water Dist. v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2006) (“The sheer volume and complexity of this ad-
ministrative record suggests that it is complete.”).  Of course, the size of the record varies greatly.  
See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
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likely.210  Petitioners often obtain through other means (for example, 
through the Freedom of Information Act211) documents that the agency 
presumptively had and considered, but that are not in the record shown to 
the court by the agency.212  An APA petitioner should then have to show 
specific facts demonstrating that the material was left out of the record, 
whether by accident or design: a “description and the date of the prof-
fered exhibits,” “when the documents were presented to the agency, to 
whom, and under what context,” and “reasonable, non-speculative” 
grounds for the petitioner’s belief that the materials were considered di-
rectly by the decisionmaker.213  However, even if the agency adds mate-
rial to the agency record during litigation (perhaps because the agency 
uncovered documents which it had lost but which it had relied upon in 
taking its action), that alone does not establish that the agency is holding 
back other documents.214  This “obviously incomplete” ground for rebut-
ting the presumption of agency regularity is not explicitly embraced by 
the APA, but its adoption is doctrinally proper; the doctrine simply holds 
the agencies to their APA record rule obligations. 
That said, some federal appellate courts have defined the record to 
include all materials considered directly or indirectly by the deci-
sionmaker.215  This definition of “the whole record” has proliferated and 
is used in several circuits, yet does not appear to have a principled origin.  
Indeed, there is no clear meaning as to what it means for a decisionmaker 
to have “indirectly” considered materials.  Accordingly, “the whole rec-
ord” should include only those materials that individuals working on the 
decision actually and directly considered.  Nevertheless, at least one 
court has found the presumption of completeness rebutted when the 
agency had omitted the words “or indirectly” in its formulation of the 
record rule in its briefing, giving the judge the impression that the gov-
                                                            
 210.   E.g., Buckingham Twp. v. Wykle, No. CIV. A 99-621, 2000 WL 233474, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 28, 2000). 
 211.   5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 212.   E.g., Outdoor Amusement Bus. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. ELH-16-1015, 2017 
WL 3189446, at *16–17 (D. Md. July 27, 2017). 
 213.   E.g., Pac. Shores Subdivision, Cal. Water Dist. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 448 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 6–7 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 214.   TOMAC v. Norton, 193 F. Supp. 2d 182, 195 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The fact that the defendants 
have supplemented the record with approximately 70 pages of additional information does not raise 
significant questions as to the completeness of the record, particularly when the supplementary mate-
rial is accompanied by affidavits stating that searches were completed to ensure that no additional 
documents were omitted.”), vacated, No. 01-0398, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4633 (Mar. 24, 2005). 
 215.   E.g., Pub. Power Council v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 791, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1982) (Kennedy, J.) 
(the first federal appeals court to use this formulation, quoting Overton Park and Camp v. Pitts); Bar 
MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 739 (10th Cir. 1993); accord In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 
371, 372 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting from grant of stay). 
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ernment was coyly withholding documents.216 
Second, petitioners should be able to rebut the presumption agency 
regularity in the administrative record if the agency produces no record 
at all.217  This is grounded in 5 U.S.C. § 706, which contemplates review 
of something (“the whole record”).218  It should be arbitrary or capricious 
for an agency to take an action, or to unreasonably delay taking an ac-
tion, without any materials in front of the agency to inform or justify that 
decision.  However, it is often unclear whether the agency lacks a record 
because it truly relied on absolutely nothing in acting, or because it is 
sluggish in compiling the record.219 
Third, a court should be able to consider extra-record evidence of 
which it properly takes judicial notice.  Theoretically, this is not “com-
pleting” the record; judicial notice puts more evidence before the court 
for it to consider.  However, judicial notice should be available to federal 
courts as it is allowed by the Federal Rules of Evidence and pertains to a 
limited set of materials which should generally be beyond controversy.220  
For example, a court should be able to take judicial notice of distances 
between cities, a fact basic enough that perhaps the parties simply as-
sumed such as being within the ken of the agency and the regulated par-
ties, but without which a court cannot quite reach a decision on the agen-
cy’s action.  Although each piece of evidence potentially subject to 
judicial notice must meet the strictures of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
documents commonly subject to judicial notice outside of the APA con-
text include transcripts of congressional hearing testimony221 and materi-
als from the agency’s website,222 though not an inspector general’s re-
port.223  The view on judicial notice as it relates to the APA is not 
                                                            
 216.   Pitman v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. 2:17-cv-166, 2018 WL 3232355, at 
*3 (D. Utah July 2, 2018).  
 217.   Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971). 
 218.   5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 219.   See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420 (expressing that “the Secretary can . . . require . . . 
an adequate explanation for [the Secretary’s] actions. Such an explanation will, to some extent, be a 
‘post hoc rationalization’ and thus must be viewed critically.”) 
 220.   FED. R. EVID. 201(a), (b) (permitting a court in a civil action to take judicial notice of an 
adjudicative fact “that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within 
the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources 
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”, but not extending to “legislative facts”).  E.g., 
United States v. Lopez, 880 F.3d 974, 982 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 221.   In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 503–504 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also 
Whiting v. AARP, 637 F.3d 355, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding no abuse of discretion where the 
district court declined to take judicial notice of congressional materials). 
 222.   Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 705 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 223.   Cty. of San Miguel v. Kempthorne, 587 F. Supp. 2d 64, 78 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The Court 
knows nothing about the investigative process which led to the report’s conclusions, and it cannot 
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universal.  At least one federal district court has concluded that this is an 
inappropriate basis for completing or supplementing the record,224 and a 
federal court of appeals has implied the same.225 
Finally, courts should permit the parties to add materials to the rec-
ord upon joint stipulation.226  The APA does not appear to explicitly 
permit this procedure, but it is not obvious why the court should stop the 
parties from doing so.  If the agency concludes that its decision is sound 
but requires a fuller, extra-record basis (perhaps the issue is highly tech-
nical and requires a background explanation of the field), then it will 
save time and resources for the court to review the agency’s decision 
sooner, rather than later after a remand to add these categories.  If the 
agency has concluded that adding material does not hamper its mission—
and so long as the material does more than serve a forbidden post hoc ra-
tionalization—then the court should defer to the agency. 
C. What Does Not Belong in the Record 
Beyond these limited categories of documents, other documents do 
not belong in the record.  An agency may use these definitional non-
inclusions or privileges to justify nonproduction or redaction, and so a 
court should not order the agency to complete or supplement the record 
with those materials.227  Courts disagree, however, and have several cat-
egories of documents which they allow to be added to the administrative 
record or to justify discovery from the agency.228  We count at least six 
such categories, although courts’ formulations vary from case to case, 
even within the same circuit. 
First, the agency’s deliberative process does not fall within scope of 
                                                            
access the report’s validity. . . .”). 
 224.   Silver State Land, LLC v. Beaudreau, 59 F. Supp. 3d 158, 172 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Judicial 
notice is ‘typically an inadequate mechanism’ for a court to consider extra-record evidence in re-
viewing an agency action. ‘Instead, a court may only consider an adjudicative fact subject to judicial 
notice that is not part of the administrative record if it qualifies for supplementation as extra-record 
evidence . . .’” (quoting Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P. v. Sebelius, 971 F. Supp. 2d 15, 32 n.14 (D.D.C. 
2013)) (citation omitted)). 
 225.   Budhathoki v. Nielsen, 898 F.3d 504, 517 (5th Cir. 2018) (denying the plaintiffs’ motion 
to take judicial notice of certain state-court orders, concluding that “[t]hese documents are not part of 
the administrative record, could not have been considered by the agency making the decision, and 
are therefore irrelevant to this appeal.” (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973))). 
 226.   Bos. Redevelopment Auth. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 838 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2016); Walter O. 
Boswell Mem’l Hosp. v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 788, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 227.   Izaak Walton League v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding the principle 
“well established” that “an agency may claim a privilege with respect to documents that may have 
influenced a particular decision”). 
 228.   See infra notes 215–255 and accompanying text.  
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“the whole record.”229  The deliberative-process principle excludes mate-
rials from an administrative record if they are privileged and deliberative 
in nature: “documents that reflect advisory opinions, recommendations 
and deliberations comprising part of a process by which government de-
cisions and policies are formulated.”230  Some courts have recognized a 
“consultant corollary” doctrine that “protects documents between the 
agency and third parties enlisted to assist the agency in their decision-
making process.”231 
Courts have good reason to protect materials reflecting the agency’s 
deliberative process.  Deliberative process is central to the operation of 
the administrative state.232  The doctrine advances “the policy of open, 
frank discussion between subordinate and chief concerning administra-
tive action,”233 allowing decisionmakers to freely “explore possibilities, 
engage in internal debates, or play devil’s advocate without fear of public 
scrutiny.” 234  The protection thus shields “premature disclosure of pro-
posed policies before they have been finally formulated or adopted.”235  
The doctrine also prevents “confusing the issues and misleading the pub-
lic by dissemination of documents suggesting reasons and rationales for a 
course of action which were not in fact the ultimate reasons for the agen-
cy’s action.”236  The protection serves to improve the quality of the agen-
                                                            
 229.   E.g., Ocean, Inc. v. Ross, 290 F. Supp. 3d 73, 82–83 (D.D.C. 2018) (Courts in this District 
have long held that materials that fall within the scope of the deliberative process privilege are not 
part of the administrative record.”).  
 230.   F.T.C. v. Warner Commc’ns Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing NLRB v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975)); see also, e.g., Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1458 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that to fall within deliberative process, 
the materials must be (1) pre-decisional and (2) deliberative, that is, actually expressing an opinion 
on a policy); Utah Med. Prods. v. McClellan, No. 2:03–CV–00525, 2004 WL 988877, at *2 (2004) 
(internal quotations omitted) (finding the deliberative process privilege applies when documents are 
“pre-decisional” and “deliberative”); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1117 
(9th Cir. 1988) (same).  One scholar argues that the deliberative process doctrine’s “roots lie in a 
now discredited 1841 decision of the British House of Lords,” and that the doctrine was “rooted in 
the need to protect sensitive military information.”  Michael Ray Harris, Standing in the Way of Ju-
dicial Review: Assertion of the Deliberative Process Privilege in APA Cases, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
349, 359–61 (2009) (citations omitted). 
 231.   Stand Up for Cal.! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 315 F. Supp. 3d 289, 298 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 232.   William R. Sherman, The Deliberation Paradox and Administrative Law, 2015 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 413, 417–23 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 
(1984)) (describing the centrality of the deliberation process in administrative law and the judicial 
respect for that process generally using the APA’s instructions for adjudication and rulemaking (e.g., 
§§ 553’s and 554’s requirements that the agency must consider facts and arguments)). 
 233.   Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 38, 48 (1958) (Reed, J. 
(ret.), sitting by designation).  Kaiser Aluminum, although cited in APA cases, was not an APA case. 
 234.   Assembly of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 235.   Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 236.   Id. 
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cy’s policy decisions. 
There is a circuit split over whether deliberative process materials 
belong in the APA record and must be logged as privileged.  Many 
courts find the material to be definitionally part of the record,237 but priv-
ileged and qualified.238  Courts are also split on whether a privilege log is 
required.239  Circuits allowing a deliberative-process protection often im-
pose requirements for its invocation.240  Courts may require the purport-
edly deliberative documents to be logged and reviewed upon challenge in 
camera.241 
Other courts conclude that deliberative process materials need not be 
disclosed because of the prudential concerns about exposing the agency’s 
                                                            
 237.   E.g., In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1207 (9th Cir. 2017) (interpreting the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s definition of the administrative record—“all documents and materials directly or indirectly 
considered by agency decision-makers”—to include “materials relied on by subordinates who direct-
ly advised the ultimate decision-makers.” (quoting Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 885 F.2d 551, 
555 (9th Cir. 1989))), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 443. 
 238.   See, e.g., In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371, 371 (2017) (granting stay of discovery orders 
pending disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari or mandamus); Utah Med. Prod. v. McClel-
lan, No. 2:03-CV-00525, 2004 WL 988877, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 31, 2004) (deeming a particular 
document to be covered under the deliberative process privilege after (1) inquiring whether “the 
privilege applies to the documents at issue”, and (2) balance[ing] “the parties’ interests to determine 
whether the documents should be produced, even if they are deliberative” with the burden on the 
agency for (1) and the petitioner for (2)); In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(stating that a showing of “compelling need” can overcome the qualified deliberative process privi-
lege); Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. CV 14-1667, 2015 WL 
3606419, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015) (adopting the same test); Branch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 
638 F.2d 873, 882 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (“[P]urely factual information is not protected by the privi-
lege.”). 
 239.   The D.C. Circuit does not require a privilege log.  Oceana, Inc. v. Pritzker, 217 F. Supp. 3d 
310, 320 (D.D.C. 2016) (collecting cases and holding that “[to require] all predecisional and deliber-
ative documents . . . be logged in a Vaughn-type index would place a significant burden on agencies 
whose decisions are challenged as arbitrary and capricious.”); see also Stand Up for Cal.! v. Dep’t of 
Interior, 71 F. Supp. 3d 109, 123 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[P]rivileged and deliberative materials are not part 
of the administrative record as a matter of law.”); Nat’l Ass’n of Chain Drug Stores v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 631 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2009).  Other courts require a privilege log 
for assertion of the deliberative process exemption.  E.g., Cal. Native Plant Soc’y v. U.S. E.P.A., 251 
F.R.D. 408, 413 (N.D. Cal. 2008); see also New York v. Salazar, 701 F. Supp. 2d 224, 239 
(N.D.N.Y. 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:08-CV-644, 2011 WL 1938232 
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011). 
 240.   ARKRAY USA, Inc. v. United States, No. 14-233C, 2014 WL 2905127, at *4 n.15 (Fed. 
Cl. Apr. 28, 2014) (requiring for invocation of the deliberative-process privilege that (1) the agency 
head or an authorized delegate assert the privilege, (2) state with particularity what information is to 
be excluded, and (3) provide the court with precise or certain reasons for maintaining the confidenti-
ality); see also, Branch, 638 F.2d at 882–83 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).  One circuit judge in dissent has 
argued that the deliberative-process privilege may be invoked only by an agency head.  Marriott Int’l 
Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 437 F.3d 1302, 1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 241.   See, e.g., In re United States, 875 F.3d at 1210 (citing district courts within the Ninth Cir-
cuit), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 443. 
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internal deliberations.242  Alternatively, many courts find that deliberative 
process materials do not fall within the definition of an APA record be-
cause pre-decisional views do not constitute the final agency action as 
required for judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 706.243 
There are limitations to the non-record designation of process mate-
rials.  Some courts permit a litigant who meets Overton Park’s “strong 
showing of bad faith or improper behavior” standard to make the deci-
sion-making process itself the subject of the litigation, and thus be per-
mitted to discover the agency’s deliberative process.244  Some courts 
                                                            
 242.   E.g., FED. R. APP. 16, 17; San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n, 789 F.2d 26, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc); Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1458 (1st Cir. 1992); In re U.S. Dep’t of Def. & U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 
Final Rule, No. 15-3751, 2016 WL 5845712, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 4, 2016) (“Deliberative process 
materials are generally exempted from inclusion in the record in order to protect the quality of agen-
cy decisions by ensuring open and candid communications.”); Tafas v. Dudas, 530 F. Supp. 2d 786, 
794 (E.D. Va. 2008) (“First, judicial review of agency action should be based on an agency’s stated 
justification, not the predecisional process that led up to the final, articulated decision. . . . Second, 
excluding deliberative materials prevents injury to the quality of agency decisions by encouraging 
uninhibited and frank discussion of legal and policy matters.” (internal quotation marks and altera-
tions omitted)), vacated and remanded sub nom, 328 Fed. Appx. 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Carlsson v. 
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. 2:12-cv-7893, 2015 WL 1467174, at *7 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 23, 2015); Madison Cty. Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 622 F.2d 393, 395 
n.3 (8th Cir. 1980) (indicating in dicta that “staff memoranda and recommendations . . . used by an 
agency in reaching a decision . . . may be excluded from the record because of concerns over proper 
agency functioning.”).  
  This is the subject of a recent case before the U.S. Supreme Court, In re United States, 
where the agency argued, “Nothing in the APA suggests that an agency compiling a record for in-
formal agency action must include every piece of paper that might touch on the subject, and this 
Court has made clear that courts are not authorized to add to the APA’s requirements.”  Reply Brief 
for the Petitioners at *4, In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017) (No. 17-801) (citing Vt. Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978)), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 
443 (2017). 
 243.   E.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Office of the Comptroller of the Curren-
cy, 156 F.3d 1279, 1279–80 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Agency deliberations not part of the record are 
deemed immaterial. . . . That is because the actual subjective motivation of agency decisionmakers is 
immaterial as a matter of law. . . .”); San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, 789 F.2d at 45; Town of 
Norfolk, 968 F.2d at 1458; In re U.S. Dep’t of Def. & U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Final Rule, 2016 
WL 5845712, at *2 (“Deliberative process materials are generally exempted from inclusion in the 
record in order to protect the quality of agency decisions by ensuring open and candid communica-
tions.”); Tafas, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 794 (“First, judicial review of agency action should be based on 
an agency’s stated justification, not the predecisional process that led up to the final, articulated de-
cision. . . . Second, excluding deliberative materials prevents injury to the quality of agency deci-
sions by encouraging uninhibited and frank discussion of legal and policy matters.” (internal quota-
tion marks and alterations omitted)). 
 244.   Salazar, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 238; see also In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency, 156 F.3d at 1280 (“[O]ur holding that the deliberative pro-
cess privilege is unavailable is limited to those circumstances in which the cause of action is directed 
at the agency’s subjective motivation.”); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 638 F.2d 994, 1000 (7th 
Cir. 1980) (requiring deliberative documents where plaintiff “contends that Agency personnel im-
properly commingled adjudicative and prosecutorial functions and relied upon improper ex parte 
communications in arriving at the decision. . . .”), vacated, 732 F.2d 97 (1984).  Courts permit APA 
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have found that assertions of deliberative process are subject to waiv-
er.245  The deliberative-process privilege has been criticized as abused by, 
and overly deferential to, the federal government.246 
Because these materials do not belong in the record in the first place, 
no log is required for deliberative-process material not included in the 
administrative record.247  In other words, whether the deliberative-
process material is privileged is irrelevant.  A court may prefer to review 
the withheld or redacted information in camera to ensure it is properly 
outside the scope of the record (e.g., deliberative process) or properly 
privileged.248  A court may also require the government file the unredact-
ed version under seal.249 
A second class of materials that does not compose “the whole rec-
ord” is privileged material—besides deliberative-process material—
which may be redacted or excluded and logged.  One type of common 
administrative record privilege is the attorney-client privilege.250  The at-
torney-client privilege protects communications between attorneys and 
their client agencies that provide confidential information or legal ad-
vice.251  APA cases apply non-APA case law for this privilege.252  In the 
                                                            
petitioners to make the decision-making process the subject of the litigation despite the fact that, as 
discussed later, the “bad faith or improper behavior” exception is a merits issue and not a records 
issue.  See infra Section IV.B.  
 245.   Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 771, 777–79 (N.D. Ind. 
1996) (requiring addition of deliberative documents and draft reports to the administrative record but 
allowing the government to seek a protective order to assert deliberative process privilege). 
 246.   Harris, supra note 230, at 404–11.  
 247.   Great Am. Ins. Co. v. United States, No. 12-C-9718, 2013 WL 4506929, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 23, 2013) (“The law is clear: [since] predecisional and deliberative documents ‘are not part of 
the administrative record to begin with,’ . . . they ‘do not need to be logged as withheld from the 
administrative record.’” (quoting Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 634 F. Supp. 2d 49, 52 (D.D.C. 2009))). 
 248.   E.g., Nat’l Courier Ass’n v. Bd. of Govs. of Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229, 1243 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975) (finding no significant omission and denying petitioners’ request for disclosure of the 
redacted portions of internal agency memoranda); Smith v. Brady, 813 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 (E.D. 
Wis. 1993). 
 249.   E.g., Poett v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 2d 230, 234 n.2 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 250.   Modesto Irrigation Dist. v. Gutierrez, No. 1:06-CV-00453, 2007 WL 763370, at *12 (E.D. 
Cal. Mar. 9, 2007) (“As with the deliberative process privilege, the attorney-client privilege is appli-
cable in administrative record cases.”); New York v. Salazar, 701 F. Supp. 2d 224, 239 (N.D.N.Y. 
2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:08-CV-644, 2011 WL 1938232 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 
8, 2011). 
 251.   The Ninth Circuit, for example, applies the privilege as follows: 
(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought,(2) from a professional legal adviser in his 
capacity as such, 
(3) [to] the communications relating to that purpose, 
(4) made in confidence 
(5) by the client, 
(6) [which] are at the client’s instance permanently protected 
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APA context, the privilege applies where the agency is the client and a 
government attorney is counsel.253  Some courts of appeal are imprecise 
about how broadly the privilege may be asserted: “Because the attorney-
client privilege obstructs the truth-finding process, it is construed nar-
rowly.”254  But, “there may be an unusual and extraordinary circumstance 
where a document protected by the attorney-client privilege should be 
made part of the administrative record.”255 
Another privilege protects attorney work product.  This privilege 
provides qualified protection for tangible material prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation by a party or its representative.256  The Supreme Court 
has expressed solicitude for the “inviolate” doctrine, reasoning that ab-
sent the doctrine, “[i]nefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would 
inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of 
cases for trial. . . . [T]he interests of the clients and the cause of justice 
would be poorly served.”257 
The privilege protecting agency work product is qualified because 
the APA petitioner may access fact work product if it is otherwise dis-
coverable and if the party demonstrates a “substantial need for the mate-
rials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their 
substantial equivalent by other means.”258  If these conditions are met, 
                                                            
(7) from disclosure by himself or by legal adviser 
(8) unless the protection [is] waived. 
Matter of Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977); accord Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 618 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (“The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications from clients to 
their attorneys made for the purpose of securing legal advice or services.” (citing In re Sealed Case, 
737 F.2d 94, 98–99 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). 
 252.   Modesto Irrigation Dist., 2007 WL 763370, at *13.  
 253.   E.g., Tax Analysts, 117 F.3d at 618. 
 254.   Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 (3d Cir. 1991) (col-
lecting cases from the D.C., Third, and Seventh Circuits). 
 255.   Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1458 (1st Cir. 1992).  
This privilege can be waived through disclosure of the protected material to a third party, so the ma-
terial might be subject to inclusion in the administrative record.  See, e.g., United States v. Dakota, 
197 F.3d 821, 825 (6th Cir. 1999); Westinghouse Elec., 951 F.2d at 1422; McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. EEOC, 922 F. Supp. 235, 243 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 
1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“There is no bright line test for determining what constitutes the subject 
matter of a waiver, rather courts weigh the circumstances of the disclosure, the nature of the legal 
advice sought and the prejudice to the parties of permitting or prohibiting further disclosures.”). 
 256.   Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Gates, No. 07-254, 2008 WL 2185180, at *10 (D. Haw. May 27, 
2008) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)). 
 257.   Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947), superseded by statute, FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b). 
 258.   FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii); see also, Office of Thrift Supervision v. Vincent & Elkins, 
LLP, 124 F.3d 1304, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“A party can discover fact work product upon showing 
a substantial need for the materials and an undue hardship in acquiring the information any other 
way. Opinion work product, on the other hand, is virtually undiscoverable.” (citing Upjohn Co. v. 
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then the agency’s work product must be furnished to the petitioner.259 
Another privilege that expectedly arises when dealing with the feder-
al government covers classified information.  Some courts require un-
classified summaries of classified evidence.260  Courts should carefully 
evaluate privilege claims of classified information because federal regu-
lations govern permissible agency disclosure.261 
Some materials are not privileged but are protected resources none-
theless.  Copyrighted material, for example, may appear in the record ei-
ther directly, or the record may reflect incorporation of copyrighted 
standards.262  The agency “may be prohibited from publishing that mate-
rial absent consent of the copyright owner.”263  This protection is not 
specific to the administrative record or APA contexts.264  This issue may 
be particularly problematic for agencies facing APA litigation because 
many courts require the agencies to file the administrative records on the 
public docket as opposed to simply producing the administrative records 
to the opposing party.265  Filing the administrative records would permit 
individuals to view and copy the material without paying royalties.266  
Therefore, some agencies like the Department of Transportation, the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Food and Drug 
Administration insert a notice into the record that copyrighted material 
composing the record will not be shown and the interested reader must 
contact the court clerk’s office to view the copyrighted material in hard 
copy form.267 
Confidential business information and trade secrets merit similar so-
licitude.  Some agencies, like the Federal Trade Commission, are statuto-
rily charged with protecting confidential business information and trade 
                                                            
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401–02 (1981))). 
 259.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) (providing greater protection for opinion work product); 
Ocean Mammal Inst., 2008 WL 2185180, at *13 (assessing whether attorney work-product was dis-
coverable in an APA action); cf. CP Salmon Corp. v. Pritzker, 238 F. Supp. 3d 1165, 1176–77 (D. 
Alaska 2017) (ordering the petitioners to return attorney work product that had been inadvertently 
included in the record, and the agency to file a revised administrative record). 
 260.   See, e.g., Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 980–85 
(9th Cir. 2012); Holy Land Found. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing People’s 
Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1242–43 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Global Relief 
Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 261.   E.g., 28 C.F.R. § 17 (2012); Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Jan. 5, 2010). 
 262.   BECK, supra note 35, at 50–52. 
 263.   Id. at 51. 
 264.   Id. at 50–52. 
 265.   Id. at 51–52. 
 266.   Id.  
 267.   Id. at 51.  
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secrets.268  Other agencies address the problem on the front end.269  For 
example, some warn the public that any confidential business infor-
mation included with public comments will be made public in an admin-
istrative record.270 
Finally, some subject-matter-specific statutes concern an agency’s 
ability to disclose certain information, like the Bank Secrecy Act,271 the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996’s 
protections of asylum information,272 or the Internal Revenue Code’s 
protections of taxpayer return information.273 
The contours of “the whole record” depend on the subject matter, the 
context, and the circuit in which APA review is sought.  Even when the 
standards are ascertainable, they are often imprecise.  It is amid this im-
precision that the bench and bar begin to stray into materials that clearly 
do not belong in “the whole record.” 
D. Supplementation Is an Improper Means of Inserting Documents into 
an APA Administrative Record 
Having plumbed the proper interpretation of “the whole record” by 
explaining the limited instances in which a court may consider docu-
ments beyond those presented by an agency and flagging instances in 
which documents may nonetheless be excluded from the administrative 
record, we now turn to the circumstances under which APA petitioners 
improperly try to supplement the record with additional documents. 
Petitioners can circumvent the APA’s record rule in a number of 
ways.  Petitioners may bring constitutional or non-APA claims challeng-
ing agency action and claim those arguments exempt them from the rec-
ord rule.274  In one practice, petitioners acknowledge the prevalence of 
                                                            
 268.   Id. at 53 n.316 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 46(f); 16 C.F.R. §§ 4.9–.10). 
 269.   Id. at 53. 
 270.   Id. 
 271.   31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(k) (2012). 
 272.   8 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2012).  
 273.   26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012).  Although sensitive information such as financial account num-
bers ordinarily must be redacted in civil litigation, FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a)(4), that requirement does 
not apply to APA records, FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(b)(2). 
 274.   See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (holding that although the National Security 
Act of 1947 precluded APA review of a due process claim, that claim was reviewable outside the 
APA structure: “[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its 
intent to do so must be clear.”).  
  To invoke judicial review on a constitutional claim notwithstanding the APA, the petitioner 
must allege “at least a colorable constitutional violation.”  Torres-Aguilar v. INS, 246 F.3d 1267, 
1271 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] petitioner may not create the jurisdiction that Congress chose to remove 
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the “whole record” rule, but argue that for various reasons they should be 
able to “supplement” the record with documents that they already pos-
sess or that they seek to discover from the agency.275 
Generally, courts and scholars divide additions of materials to the ju-
dicial record into two categories.  First, completion, as discussed above, 
adds material that was considered by the agency but not included in the 
record.276  Such documents inextricably compose “the whole record.”  In 
contrast, the second category, supplementation, is “a circumstance in 
which a party seeks to add extra-record or extra-judicial information to 
the record that was concededly not before the agency.”277  Petitioners 
may make the same argument under the banner of completion, supple-
mentation, or both, and courts are not consistent on terminology, often 
conflating the two.278  Petitioners may ask courts to use discovery to 
conduct completion or supplementation, instead of remanding to the 
agency (regardless of vacatur or retention of jurisdiction).279 
The landscape of completion and supplementation, as practiced, is 
unkempt terrain.  Courts disagree as to which exceptions exist, how to 
prove them, and how to classify them.  Moreover, some disagreements 
are not just among circuits, but also intra-circuit.280 
                                                            
simply by cloaking an abuse of discretion argument in constitutional garb.”); compare, e.g., Chiayu 
Chang v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 254 F. Supp. 3d 160, 163 (D.D.C. 2017) (rejecting 
such a claim stating “[p]laintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that the retroactivity claim is a 
separate cause of action that exists outside the APA and is therefore exempt from the record review 
rule” (emphasis in original)), and Jarita Mesa Livestock Grazing Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 58 F. 
Supp. 3d 1191, 1238 (D.N.M. 2014) (denying discovery on First Amendment claim stating “al-
low[ing] fresh discovery, submission of new evidence and legal arguments . . . [would] incentivize 
every unsuccessful party to agency action to allege . . . constitutional violations to trade in the APA’s 
restrictive procedures for the more even-handed ones of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”), with 
Carlsson v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. 2:21-cv-7893, 2015 WL 1467174, at *13–14 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2015) (limiting discovery on a non-APA claim). 
 275.   BECK, supra note 35, at 69–71. 
 276.   See supra Section III.B. 
 277.   Oceana, Inc. v. Ross, 290 F. Supp. 3d 73, 78 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Univ. of Colo. Health 
at Mem. Hosp. v. Burwell, 151 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2015) (internal quotation marks and em-
phasis omitted)). 
 278.   E.g., Stand Up for Cal.! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 315 F. Supp. 3d 289, 294 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(referencing a plaintiffs’ “Mot. To Complete and/or Supplement the Administrative R. and for Leave 
to Conduct Disc.”); Lands Council v. Forester of Region One of the U.S. Forest Serv., 395 F.3d 
1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2005) (referencing an internally inconsistent maxim that “a reviewing court 
may require supplementation of the administrative record if it is incomplete.” (citing Camp v. Pitts, 
411 U.S. 138, 142–43 (1973))).  
 279.   See, e.g., Little Co. of Mary Hosp. v. Sebelius, 587 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 280.   See, e.g., Axiom Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (identifying tension within the D.C. Circuit on this issue); Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Sala-
zar, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1278–79 (D. Colo. 2010) (identifying tension within the Tenth Circuit on 
this issue).  
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While nominal completion is generally a permissible basis to rebut 
the presumption of agency regularity, there is a notable exception.  Over-
ton Park notes that a court may permit the record to be completed upon 
“a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.”281  This method of 
record supplementation has no textual grounding in the APA and was 
created by the Court, without citation or explanation, to facilitate Article 
III review.282  More precisely, Overton Park said that a strong showing of 
bad faith or improper behavior permitted the courts to “require the ad-
ministrative officials who participated in the decision to give testimony 
explaining their action[s].”283  The “bad faith or improper behavior” lan-
guage, however, has since been interpreted to permit a court to allow any 
type of record supplementation.284  This method for determining bad 
faith and improper behavior theoretically applies with both subtraction 
(failing to include documents adverse to the agency decision) and addi-
tion (improperly adding to the records documents favorable to the agency 
decision—that is, verboten post hoc rationalizations).285 
Courts vary on what meets this standard but they have avoided pro-
nouncing general guidelines for “bad faith or improper behavior” in fa-
vor of making ad hoc calls.286  The courts that do define “bad faith or im-
proper behavior” often do so in the negative and imply that the threshold 
is high: “Mere allegations that it appeared that the agency had a hostile 
attitude, or unwillingness to correct errors, or severity of action, or had a 
predetermined agenda, simply do not meet this standard.”287  Nor do 
                                                            
 281.   Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971), abrogated on oth-
er grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
 282.   See id.  See also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); supra Section II.F.  
 283.   Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420. 
 284.   Id.  See also, Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(“When as here there is a contemporaneous administrative record and no need for additional expla-
nation of the agency decision, ‘there must be a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior’ 
before the reviewing court may permit discovery and evidentiary supplementation of the administra-
tive record.” (quoting Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420)).  
 285.   Cf. Univ. of Colo. Health at Mem’l Hosp. v. Burwell, 151 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(“Reviewing ‘less than the full administrative record,’ might ‘allow a party to withhold evidence 
unfavorable to its case,’ while reviewing ‘more than the information before the agency at the time of 
its decision,’ risks ‘requiring administrators to be prescient or allowing them to take advantage of 
post hoc rationalizations.’” (quoting Walter O. Boswell Mem’l Hosp. v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 788, 792 
(D.C. Cir. 1984))). 
 286.   Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 230–32 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (declaring, 
“What constitutes a strong preliminary showing of bad faith or improper behavior, however, is a 
matter that the courts have been reluctant to define, preferring in the main simply to declare that on 
the facts of a given case, the showing has not, or occasionally has, been made,” before finding bad 
faith or improper behavior). 
 287.   BECK, supra note 34, at 72 n.408 (citing James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 
1095 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).  See CACI, Inc. Fed. v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1579–82 (Fed. Cir. 
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mere allegations, however serious, that “have not been documented with 
the requisite degree of specificity,” such as mere inferences from a hear-
ing transcript.288  Neither errors in the initial compilation of an adminis-
trative record, later corrected, nor an inadvertent loss of some documents 
make for a “strong showing” that an agency is deliberately withholding 
pertinent documents.289  And according to Justices Gorsuch and Thomas, 
the necessary showing actually “requires an extraordinary justification,” 
as it is leveled “against a coordinate branch of government.”290  In that 
case, “bad faith” does not exist simply because the decisionmaker takes 
office and seeks to implement views he held pre-appointment.291 
However, the Court of Federal Claims has cautioned that “rare in-
deed would be the occasions when evidence of bad faith will be placed in 
an administrative record, and to insist on this—and thus restrict discov-
ery regarding bad faith to cases involving officials who are both sinister 
and stupid—makes little sense.”292  Bad faith was found, for example, 
when the petitioner pointed out the agency’s “clearly hurried review pro-
cess,” its “effort to issue the decision before the change in Presidential 
Administrations,” and “political pressure” from a Senate committee.293  
The D.C. Circuit has suggested that impermissible bias includes congres-
sional pressures.294 
                                                            
1983) (requiring “inferences of actual or potential wrongdoing” to be based on “hard facts,” not 
“suspicion and innuendo”), superseded by statute, 40 U.S.C. § 3307 (2016). 
 288.   San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 751 F.2d 1287, 1327–29 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted) (“The ease with which charges of ‘bad faith’ could be leveled, 
combined with the inordinate burden resolution of such claims would entail for courts, persuade us 
to decline petitioners’ invitation to review the transcripts and to supplement the record. . . . A great 
many parties could make similar accusations of impropriety in future litigation. . . . Courts do not 
have a limitless capacity to review documents in camera on the off-chance that something might turn 
up. . . . [Additionally,] over-eagerness by courts to review documents in camera and to supplement 
the administratively-created record fails to respect the autonomy of administrative agencies and the 
strong presumption that when administrative officials purport to decide weighty issues within their 
domain they have conscientiously considered the issues.” (internal quotations marks omitted)), over-
ruled on other grounds, 789 F.2d 26, 43–45 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc). 
 289.   TOMAC v. Norton, 193 F. Supp. 2d 182, 194 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d, 433 F.3d 852 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006).  But see Stand Up for Cal.! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 315 F. Supp. 3d 289, 296 (D.D.C. 
2018) (permitting supplementation of the administrative record on grounds of bad faith where the 
petitioners made only a “prima facie case”). 
 290.   In re Dep’t of Commerce, No. 18A375, 2018 WL 5259090, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2018) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 291.   Id. 
 292.   Beta Analytics Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 223, 226 (2004).  Although this case 
was not brought under the APA, the court’s reasoning draws from an earlier Court of Federal Claims 
case that cites Overton Park.  See Orion Int’l Techs. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 338, 344 n.14 
(2004). 
 293.   Stand Up for Cal.!, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 296. 
 294.   D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1246 (D.C. Cir.) (“[An administra-
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Some courts interpret this bad faith exception overbroadly.  One 
court said it was enough to show evidence merely “suggesting that the 
agency decision is arbitrary and capricious,” in which case the agency is 
required to provide an explanation—thereby conflating a merits question 
with a record question.295  Such decisions raise problems because APA 
petitioners can easily acquire agency documents that they claim should 
have been part of the record by the Freedom of Information Act,296 the 
Privacy Act,297 or other means.  These enterprising individuals can then 
use these documents to press a claim of bad faith.298 
This doctrine is sometimes imprecisely employed as a freestanding 
supplementation ground.  Consequently, if bad faith is shown, petitioners 
are apparently free to conduct discovery of unclear scope, perhaps not 
even related to the matters about which the agency acted in bad faith.299  
Other courts permit supplementation only if the proffered supplementary 
materials themselves are probative of bad faith, which presumably are 
relevant to the merits question of whether the agency acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously.300  Given the divergent manners in which courts interpret 
this Overton Park dicta, there is no clear distinction upon which to seg-
regate bad faith and improper behavior into two separate bases. 
The “bad faith and improper behavior” doctrine is untenable be-
                                                            
tive adjudication] would be invalid if based in whole or in part on the [congressional] pressures.”).  
See Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kempthorne, 587 F. Supp. 2d 389, 409–10 (D. Conn. 2008); 
Stand Up for Cal.!, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 296. 
 295.   Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1049 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (citations omitted) (“[T]he presumption of agency regularity is rebutted, as where the agency 
has demonstrated undue bias towards particular private interests; where the agency has had a history 
of ad hoc and inconsistent judgments on a particular question; where the agency has arrived at an 
identical result after remand from a reviewing court for further explanation of reasons; or when an 
agency has departed from its consistent and longstanding precedents or policies.”).  
 296.   5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). See, e.g., Outdoor Amusement Bus. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., No. ELH-16-1015, 2017 WL 3189446, at *11 (D. Md. July 27, 2017).  Such use of the Free-
dom of Information Act is unsurprising because that law is a subpart of the APA. 
 297.   5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012). 
 298.   E.g., Outdoor Amusement Bus. Ass’n, 2017 WL 3189446, at *6, *20–22 (plaintiff’s coun-
sel using FOIA returns to allege bad faith withholding of documents properly in the record). 
 299.   E.g., Tri-Valley CARES v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012); 
Town of Winthrop v. FAA, 535 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2008); Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 638–
39 (6th Cir. 1997). But see Getty Oil Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, No. CV 77-4533, 1979 WL 1029, 
at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 1979) (“[T]his Court does not believe that discovery can be utilized to find 
evidence of bad faith or improper behavior.  If discovery could be utilized for that purpose, it would 
allow extensive probing into the internal agency documents on the mere allegation of bad faith.  
Such a ruling would undermine the clear intent of the Overton Park decision.”). 
 300.   ARKRAY USA, Inc. v. United States, No. 14-233C, 2014 WL 2905127, at *4 (Fed. Cl. 
Apr. 28, 2014) (“Supplementation may be appropriate . . . where the additional evidence is likely 
probative of potential agency bias or bad faith.” (citations omitted)). 
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cause, like much of APA record jurisprudence, it conflates the record 
with the merits.  If an agency acts in bad faith or behaves improperly, 
and the improper conduct is reflected in the record already, then supple-
menting the record is unnecessary.  The court can determine from the ex-
isting administrative record whether the behavior was unlawful under the 
appropriate APA standard.  For example, if the alleged bad faith is the 
agency succumbing to political pressure, then the court has all relevant 
documents necessary to determine whether that pressure caused the 
agency to act “arbitrar[ily]” or “capricious[ly].”301 
If the agency acts in bad faith or behaves improperly, and the im-
proper conduct is not in the record presented, the question becomes 
whether the agency truly relied on its improper motivations.  If so, then 
that material is properly part of the record, and the administrative record 
is subject to completion.  The court can proceed by assessing the record 
as presented and determining whether the agency action can be upheld 
on the stated basis, acknowledging 5 U.S.C. § 706’s allowance of harm-
less error.302  Making a decision based solely on improper reasons is the 
very definition of capricious.  But if the agency did not rely on those 
bad-faith or improper motivations, its evidence does not belong in the 
record, and should not be used to “complete” the existing administrative 
record.  One court has come close to recognizing this.303 
Another inappropriate class of information that should not be added 
to the record is oral communication.  One court described oral inputs (or 
as it has also been deemed, “verbal inputs”) as “relevant information that 
by its very nature would not be found in an agency record—such as . . . 
the content of conversations.”304  Including oral communications in the 
                                                            
 301.   5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 302.   5 U.S.C. § 706 (“In [reviewing agency action,] due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error.”). 
 303.   Latecoere Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 19 F.3d 1342, 1356–57 (11th Cir. 1994) (stat-
ing that “proof of subjective bad faith by procuring officials, depriving a bidder of fair and honest 
consideration of its proposal, generally constitutes arbitrary and capricious action,” in an APA con-
tract-bid dispute, but ultimately concluding that the finding of bad faith permitted record supplemen-
tation). 
 304.   Orion Int’l Techs. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 338, 343–44 (2004).  In the DACA case 
before the Supreme Court, the district judge—the nominal respondent in the petition for a stay pend-
ing disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari—filed a statement with the Supreme Court de-
fending his order for the U.S. Government to include evidence concerning oral advice relied upon by 
the decisionmaker (or, in the district judge’s parlance, “verbal inputs”).  Statement of Dist. Court in 
Response to Application for a Stay, No. 17A570 at 4, (Dec. 5, 2017) 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-801/22797/20171206145957950_17A570%20In 
%20Re%20United%20States%20Response%20NDCA.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9J3-LP3W].  The 
district judge acknowledged that “[t]he Supreme Court has never considered how, if at all, verbal 
inputs to an agency decisionmaker should be reflected in the administrative record.”  Id.  Neverthe-
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record is incorrect, because although virtually no cases have had squarely 
addressed the issue, most cases define “the whole record” as a function 
of documents and other tangible materials.305  The order in that case es-
sentially created a second-degree administrative record, where the agen-
cy had to furnish all materials considered by individuals who in turn pro-
vided oral consultation with the decisionmaker, regardless of whether the 
intermediaries relied on the materials when providing advice.  This chain 
expands the administrative record beyond the strictures of the APA and 
Supreme Court cases like Camp v. Pitts.306  Requiring agencies to memo-
rialize, after the fact, any oral conversations would also impose a tre-
mendous burden on the agencies.  It is difficult for agencies to assess 
with certainty which employees provided oral input to decisionmakers, 
and to then reconstruct the content of such input. 
Further afield from the APA’s “whole record” anti-discovery regime 
is the concept of record supplementation.  Supplementation is categori-
cally impermissible because an APA court reviews only the record be-
fore the agency at the time it made its decision.  Therefore, information 
that is developed and presented to the agency after the agency makes its 
final action is outside the scope of APA review, post hoc under Chenery 
I,307 and irrelevant in contravention of the discovery rules.308  Consistent 
with those principles, the Court in Overton Park refused to look at the 
                                                            
less, using both the Ninth Circuit’s statement that the administrative record comprises all “docu-
ments considered directly or indirectly” and the Court of Federal Claims’ permission for a party to 
depose an agency employee after credibly alleging agency bias, the district judge concluded that 
“[t]here is no clear and indisputable right to omit all evidence of verbal inputs to the agency deci-
sionmaker.” (emphasis added) Id.  Finding that the agency decisionmaker had received oral advice 
on DACA, but that “[s]uch verbal inputs . . . were not captured by the government’s administrative 
record,” the district judge “attempted to cure this omission by requiring inclusion of all DACA-
related materials received by those providing any verbal inputs, at least up to the point of their in-
put.”  Id. 
 305.   See, e.g., Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 739 (10th Cir. 1993) (defining an 
administrative record as “all documents and materials directly or indirectly considered by the agen-
cy”) (emphasis added); James Madison Ltd. ex rel. Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (stating similar language); Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 638 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating 
similar language); Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating 
“‘[t]he whole administrative record . . . consists of all documents and materials directly or indirectly 
considered by agency decision-makers and includes evidence contrary to the agency’s position.’” 
(quoting Exxon Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 91 F.R.D 26, 33 (N.D. Tex 1981))). 
 306.   411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (“[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administra-
tive record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”). 
 307.   See supra Section II.E. But see Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 713 
F.2d 795, 799 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“Where, as in Camp . . . , the agency’s explanation is required to 
be responsive to the purposes of the enabling statute, rather than to a record developed through man-
datory hearings or public comments, post hoc explanations, while undesirable, are not fatal.”). 
 308.   FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
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agency’s extra materials created after litigation.309 
Despite this indeterminate and inconsistent language, one statute 
does suggest that supplementation may be permissible.  The Superfund 
statute explicitly states: 
[i]n any judicial action under this chapter, judicial review of any issues 
concerning the adequacy of any response action taken or ordered by the 
President shall be limited to the administrative record.  Otherwise ap-
plicable principles of administrative law shall govern whether any sup-
plemental materials may be considered by the court.310 
This implies that there are some principles of administrative law that 
permit supplementation.311  However, this may also mean that Congress 
used sloppy terminology here—as courts often do—and simply meant 
“completion.”  In any event, this statute is not part of the APA. 
Courts vary widely on the showing necessary to rebut the presump-
tion of administrative regularity in compiling an administrative record 
and to thereby permit supplementation.  The petitioner “bears the burden 
of explaining why the agency-assembled administrative record is insuffi-
cient,”312 consistent with the presumption of agency regularity.  But giv-
en the confusion in this realm, that burden varies in size.  As alluded to 
earlier, some courts require a “strong showing of bad faith or improper 
behavior.”313  Other courts speak of “clear evidence”314 or “concrete evi-
dence.”315  Others want to see “well grounded allegations” of bad faith or 
improper behavior, which is something less than “clear and convincing 
evidence.”316  Some courts demand “unusual circumstances” to justify a 
departure from the general presumption.317  One court asked only for 
                                                            
 309.   See supra notes 127, 128, 178, and accompanying text. 
 310.   42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 311.   E.g., United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1427–28 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(examining § 9613(j)(1) and holding that, as part of those “[o]therwise applicable principles of ad-
ministrative law,” the district court should have permitted supplementation of the administrative rec-
ord); United States v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., 768 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2014) (same). 
 312.   DataMill, Inc. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 722, 732 (2010). 
 313.   This standard, of course, was developed in the completion context for Overton Park.  E.g., 
Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 864 n.13 (8th Cir. 2013); Town of Winthrop v. FAA, 
535 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2008).  
 314.   E.g., Pac. Shores Subdivision, Cal. Water Dist. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 448 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 315.   E.g., Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Beaudreau, Civil Action No. 10-1067, 2012 
WL 12942599, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2012). 
 316.   L-3 Comm. Integrated Sys., L.P. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 347, 354 (2010), amended in 
part, 98 Fed. Cl. 45 (2011); Pitney Bowes Gov’t Sols., Inc. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 327, 334 
(2010). 
 317.   E.g., Medina Cty. Envtl. Action Ass’n v. Surface Transp. Bd., 602 F.3d 687, 706 (5th Cir. 
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“probabilistic showing that discovery is sufficiently likely to unearth ev-
idence relevant to deciding whether the record should be [completed].”318  
Finally, the mere size of the record may play some unspecified role in 
deciding whether to permit discovery or supplementation.319 
Supplementation comes in many forms that vary depending on the 
circuit and the district.  First, courts permit supplementation if the agency 
provided only a “bare record.”320  That language does come from Over-
ton Park, but the decision was not about how the exception works.  
Overton Park said that because the record was “bare,” the record “may 
not disclose the factors that were considered,” so it “may be necessary” 
for the district court to receive additional materials.321  The premise of 
the bare-record exception is that there are certain factors that should be 
considered, but that the record does not confirm were considered. 
But this exception fundamentally confused the merits of the case 
with the evidence needed to prove it.  If, for example, the record appears 
to reference certain materials that are not in it and the court cannot con-
firm that the materials were considered, then the record would fall under 
the demonstrably-incomplete exception and the case should be remanded 
for completion of the record.  If the record does not contain a coherent 
agency decision and the court cannot confirm how the data relates to the 
final decision, then the agency action should fail on the merits, just like 
in the important Supreme Court case of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Ass’n v. State Farm.322  The proper course is to remand for completion of 
the record or for a new decision, permitting the agency to properly con-
sider the factors. 
Perhaps the “bare record” route to supplementation means that the 
                                                            
2010) (citing Am. Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2008)); see also Motor 
& Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1104 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“[S]upplementation 
of the [administrative] record . . . decidedly is the exception not the rule.”). 
 318.   La Union del Pueblo Entero v. FEMA, 141 F. Supp. 3d 681, 695 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
 319.   NVE, Inc. v. HHS, 436 F.3d 182, 196 (3d Cir. 2006) (agreeing with the district court’s 
decision to decline discovery). 
 320.   Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971), abrogated on oth-
er grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); Little Co. of Mary Hosp. v. Sebelius, 587 
F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2009) (referring to the exception as “[where] necessary to create a record 
without which the challenge to the agency’s action cannot be evaluated,” though noting it will be 
rarely applied, and affirming the district court for refusing to do so in this case); Sierra Club v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Energy, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1271 (D. Colo. 1998) (suggesting that a court could review 
“past conduct of the agency, to determine whether an agency unlawfully withheld action required by 
law.”); see also, supra Section III.D. 
 321.   Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420. 
 322.   See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (holding that courts 
must determine whether the agency has examined all relevant data and articulated a sufficient con-
nection between the data and its decision). 
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agency necessarily but silently considered factors not apparent from the 
record.  If so, the “bare record” ground is paradoxical.  A court cannot 
know whether the agency considered factors outside the record unless it 
looks outside the record to see what those factors were and compares 
them to the record.  That constitutes a merits inquiry.  Overton Park de-
fined an arbitrary or capricious agency action as a failure to consider all 
relevant factors—the central question of a merits inquiry in a 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2) action.  Thus, a merits inquiry would rebut the presumption of 
regularity if the “bare record” actually means a “demonstrably incom-
plete” or “null” record, but only to permit completion of the record. 
To do otherwise would invite tension with Chenery I and impose un-
reasonable burdens on the agency by forcing it to write merits decisions 
that excruciatingly assess every single material considered, even when a 
court should fairly assume that a piece of evidence was considered but 
rejected or accepted.323  The reality is, however, that this is a tempting 
route for a court to take, especially one not versed in the subject matter 
being reviewed, not confronted with advocates familiar with the contours 
of APA record review, or presiding over a 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) unreasona-
ble delay case.324 
Second, some courts order supplementation to determine whether the 
agency considered all relevant factors and adequately explained its deci-
sion.325  This exception has been described more expansively as needed 
“when it is necessary for a full and complete understanding of the is-
sues.”326  This exception, however, should not be entertained for the rea-
sons discussed above as a “bare record” justification.327 
                                                            
 323.   Cf. Kurshumi v. Ashcroft, 102 F. App’x 172, 175 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The [Board of Immi-
gration Appeals] is not required to discuss each and every piece of evidence or write an exegesis on 
every contention.”); Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 570 F.3d 83, 92 (2d Cir. 2009) (“An administra-
tive agency has a duty to explain its ultimate action. . . . However, it need not explain each and every 
step leading to this decision . . . [the agency need not] sift through each piece of evidence offered by 
a party and explain why it is more or less compelling than the counter-evidence put forth by an op-
ponent.”); Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Although required to develop the rec-
ord fully and fairly, an ALJ is not required to discuss all the evidence submitted, and an ALJ’s fail-
ure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that it was not considered.”). 
 324.   See, e.g., Sierra Club, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1271; Raymond Proffitt Found. v. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 128 F. Supp. 2d 762, 768 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
 325.   BECK, supra note 35, at 67; see Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Leavitt, 470 F.3d 71, 82 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (cautioning that the explanation “should contain no new rationalizations”). 
 326.   Blue & Gold Fleet, LP v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 487, 494 (2006), aff’d, 492 F.3d 1308 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 327.   Cf. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 773 (1st Cir. 1992) (“If the agency action, once 
explained by the proper agency official, is not sustainable on the record itself, the proper judicial 
approach has been to vacate the action and to remand . . . to the agency for further consideration.”); 
Friends of Payette v. Horseshoe Bend Hydroelectric Co., 988 F.2d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 1993); Envtl. 
Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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Third, courts permit parties to supplement the administrative record 
with “background information” where “the agency failed to (a) explain 
administrative action so as to frustrate judicial review, or (b) explain 
technical terms or complex subjects.”328 Such supplementation is contra-
ry to the APA.  While it might sound innocent, “background infor-
mation” is indeterminate and opens the door to substantive considera-
tion.329  If an agency action is impenetrable to a district judge because the 
judge lacks fluency in the complex subject matter at issue, there are two 
other ways the matter could be explained to the judge.  The parties could 
supplement the record by joint stipulation to ensure the judge’s compre-
hension of the case.  The judge could also take judicial notice of back-
ground information, consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Such 
evidence would then be assured to be relatively neutral.  Otherwise, if the 
agency action is rationalized in a manner too confusing for the judge to 
determine that it was unlawful, then the petitioners have necessarily 
failed their burden.330 
Fourth, courts often want to see information supporting “predictive 
judgments.”331  Often agencies take some action based on their informed 
judgments that something may or may not occur in the future.  Up to six 
years may pass before such agency action is challenged in court, given 
the statute of limitations.332  In that timeframe, the parties may be able to 
see whether the agency’s predictions were correct.  If the agency’s pre-
dictions were incorrect, an unhappy individual may want to use evidence 
of incorrect prediction in an effort to demonstrate that the agency’s ante-
cedent action was unlawful.  For that purpose, federal courts sometimes 
permit supplementation of the administrative record with evidence that 
“c[a]me into existence after the agency acted that demonstrates that the 
agency’s actions were right or wrong.”333  This exception is improper, 
however, as it is violates the APA “whole record” rule without any coun-
tervailing policy benefits.  A federal court abets impermissible post hoc 
rationalization by considering this information as part of a supplemented 
administrative record.  Agencies should be able to exercise the latitude 
                                                            
 328.   BECK, supra note 35, at 67; see, e.g., Copar Pumice Co. v. Tidwell, 603 F.3d 780, 791 n.3 
(10th Cir. 2010); DataMill, Inc. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 722, 730 (2010). 
 329.   But see Yale-New Haven Hosp., 470 F.3d at 82 (trusting courts to not consider any explan-
atory supplementation as part of the merits). 
 330.   See supra note 172. 
 331.   BECK, supra note 35, at 71.  
 332.   See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2012) (setting the APA statute of limitations). 
 333.   BECK, supra note 35, at 71.  The D.C. Circuit reviews predictive judgments even more 
favorably, see Edison Elec. Inst. v. OSHA, 849 F.2d 611, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Nat’l Tel. Coop. 
Ass’n v. FCC, 563 F.3d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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given to them by Congress to issue predictive judgments without later 
second-guessing by affected parties whose real quarrel lies with the out-
come, not the prediction. 
Fifth, some courts grant motions to supplement the administrative 
record in cases challenging agency inaction.334  There is a record in these 
cases: the materials that the agency relied on in consciously or uncon-
sciously failing to act.335  Further, the APA in 5 U.S.C. § 706 contem-
plates a record for failure-to-act cases, as it states, “In making the forego-
ing determinations, [that is, under § 706(1) and (2),] the court shall 
review the whole record . . . .”336  Because there is already a defined 
scope for “the whole record,” this category of information is misclassi-
fied as game for supplementation.337  Agency action that is a failure to 
act should not be treated differently than any other type of agency action. 
Finally, some courts have found supplementation permissible upon 
only the petitioner’s belief (whether founded or not) that evidence not 
before the agency should have been considered by the agency.338  Of the 
record supplementation grounds, this one is the least compatible with the 
APA record rule, as it seems to permit discovery merely upon petitioners 
disagreeing with the result of an agency action.  It has no apparent con-
nection with the text, structure, purpose, or legislative history of that law.  
Like the other grounds of supplementation discussed above, courts 
should stop permitting APA petitioners to pursue it. 
                                                            
 334.   Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (recognizing “where agencies are 
sued for a failure to take action” as an exception to the general rule against supplementation); 
Friends of the Clearwater v. Dombeck, 222 F.3d 552, 560 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[In § 706(1) cases,] re-
view is not limited to the record as it existed at any single point in time, because there is no final 
agency action to demarcate the limits of the record.”). 
 335.   See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1271 (D. Colo. 1998). 
 336.   5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).  
 337.   Young, supra note 120, at 224 (“To the extent, however, that an agency’s refusal to hold 
such a proceeding is reviewable, there is a record on which the agency based its decision not to 
commence such a proceeding.  Analogously to Overton Park, the record is everything the agency 
actually considered or was required to consider in deciding not to start an adjudication or rulemak-
ing.”). 
 338.   Citizens for Alts. to Radioactive Dumping v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 485 F.3d 1091, 1096 
(10th Cir. 2007) (“In dealing with scientific and technical evidence, extra-record evidence may illu-
minate whether an [environmental impact statement] has neglected to mention a serious environmen-
tal consequence, failed adequately to discuss some reasonable alternative, or otherwise swept stub-
born problems or serious criticism . . . under the rug.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Oceana, 
Inc. v. Pritzker, 217 F. Supp. 3d 310, 316 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[A] party may request the disclosure of 
extrajudicial evidence that was not initially before the agency but the party believes should nonethe-
less be included in the administrative record.” (citations omitted)).  
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E. How to Complete the Record 
When an APA petitioner identifies a class of documents that proper-
ly belongs in “the whole record,” it must consider the procedure for ob-
jecting to the documents’ absence from the record.  The first step is for 
the petitioner to examine the record once the agency furnishes it.  Recall 
that the record is rarely compiled and maintained contemporaneous with 
the agency’s action or inaction; agencies often need time to produce the 
record.  Different courts require the agency to furnish the record at dif-
ferent points in litigation.339  Some require the record to be filed and 
specify timelines.340  Others require the record to be filed, but specify no 
timeline.341  Others make no mention of when the record should be 
served on the other party or whether it must be filed.342  Others require 
only an index of the record to be filed.343  An agency is not required to 
file a certification,344 though a certification may buttress the presumption 
                                                            
 339.   Some courts impose these requirements through local rules; other times, individual judges 
may impose these requirements through standing orders or through ad hoc scheduling orders.  See, 
e.g., D. ALASKA L.R. 16.3(b)(1) (requiring the record to be filed within 60 days after the defendants 
appear); D. KAN. L.R. 83.7.1(c)(1) (requiring the record to be filed contemporaneously with the de-
fendants’ answer, which will be 60 days after the defendants appear); D. AK. L.R. 16.3(b)(1) (requir-
ing the agency to file the record within 60 days after the defendants appear); N.D. CAL. CIVIL L.R. 
16-5 (requiring the “a certified copy of the transcript of the administrative record” to filed within 90 
days after the defendants appear); see also Valentini v. Shinseki, CV 11-4846 SJO (MRWx), 2013 
WL 12120074 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2013).  
 340.   W.D. WASH. LCR 79(h) (requiring the agency to file the record within thirty days of filing 
the complaint if the agency is the plaintiff, or with the answer if the agency is the defendant); D. 
UTAH DUCIVR 7-4 (establishing a whole regime of APA-specific case procedures).  See also FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) (setting the general rule that parties cannot seek discovery before the parties have 
had the Rule 26(f) conference, “except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 
26(a)(1)(B),” such as review of agency action). 
 341.   D. OR. LR 5-2(e). 
 342.   E.g., W.D. MO. L.R. 5.1 (requiring all represented parties must file documents electroni-
cally, but not specifying which documents an agency must file or a time period in which they must 
be filed). 
 343.   D.D.C. LCVR 7(n) (requiring agency counsel to first file a certified list of the record’s con-
tents but prohibiting the agency from filing the entire record unless ordered by the court). 
 344.   “Although the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), like many other federal 
agencies, files certifications with administrative records as a matter of practice, certifications are not 
required by the APA or any other law.  Plaintiffs have cited no authority suggesting otherwise and in 
fact expressly acknowledge in their briefing that courts in this district have held that ‘there is no le-
gal authority compelling the defendants to certify an administrative record in the first instance.’” 
Banner Health v. Sebelius, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Cty. of San Miguel v. 
Kempthorne, 587 F. Supp. 2d 64, 77 (D.D.C. 2008), vacated in part on other grounds, No. CV 10-
01638, 2013 WL 11241368 (D.D.C. July 30, 2013); Ravulapalli v. Napolitano, 840 F. Supp. 2d 200, 
206 (D.D.C. 2012) (“The lack of certification, without more, certainly does not rise to the level of 
‘clear evidence’ necessary to overcome the presumption of regularity.”) (citations omitted); Outdoor 
Amusement Bus. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. CV ELH-16-1015, 2017 WL 3189446, at 
*5, *9–11 (D. Md. July 27, 2017) (rejecting an argument that the agency was required to submit a 
certification that established, among other things, that the relevant agency official had actually con-
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of agency regularity.345 
Courts should not look into the record until threshold jurisdictional 
defenses are adjudicated, even if the merits dispute is urgent or im-
portant.346  If a court does not have specialized rules for APA proceed-
ings,347 then the court should not require the record to be furnished until 
after the pleadings close.348 
Even if the petitioner believes that “completion” material should be 
restored to the administrative or judicial record, the agency must have the 
opportunity to bring jurisdictional defenses in Rule 12(b)(1) and (2) mo-
tions to dismiss to pretermit the possibility of unnecessarily compiling, 
furnishing, and engaging the record.349  Petitioners should also have to 
surmount the bar of Rule 8(a)(2),350 which is trans-substantive, and 
demonstrate that their APA complaint states a claim upon which relief 
can be granted.  Many courts are split as to whether APA complaints are 
subject to motions to dismiss on pleading and merits grounds.351  While 
                                                            
sidered the record; it is full or complete; and it existed at the time of the decision.) (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted).  Some organic statutes require the filing of a certified administrative 
record.  E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 405I, 1383(c)(3) (2012) (regarding Social Security). 
 345.   Stainback v. Winters, 520 F. Supp. 2d 181, 188 (D.D.C. 2007).  One court, to resolve a 
dispute over the record’s completeness, ordered the agency “to affirm under oath that the Record is 
complete so that this matter may proceed to resolution.” Buckingham Twp. v. Wykle, No. CIV. A 
99-621, 2000 WL 233474, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2000). 
 346.   In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443, 445 (2017). 
 347.   See, e.g., D. UTAH DUCIVR 7-4 (establishing a regime of APA-specific case procedures); 
see also D. KAN. L.R. 83.7.1 (also establishing a regime of APA-specific case procedures); N.D. IO-
WA & S.D. IOWA L.R. 16(h) (requiring the attorneys to confer and file a “proposed scheduling order 
setting forth deadlines for the filing of the administrative record and briefs.”). 
 348.   Some organic statutes lay out a separate timeline for record filing.  For instance, in Social 
Security appeals challenging the denial of Title II disability insurance benefits or Title XI supple-
mental security income benefits, the certified record must be filed as “part of” the Commissioner’s 
answer. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (2012).  The above suggestion would apply only in the ab-
sence of an organic statute on point. 
 349.   FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)–(2); see In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443; Coal. for Under-
ground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 350.   FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 351.   Id.; Compare, e.g., Shashlov v. Sessions, No. 17-cv-2166, 2017 WL 6496440 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 4, 2017) (dismissing an APA challenge without leave to amend for failure to state a claim even 
though the record had not been served or filed), with Atieh v. Riordan, 727 F.3d 73, 75 (1st Cir. 
2013) (reversing a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of an APA action, arguing that given the 
Overton Park standard of review, the Twombly plausibility standard “does not apply” in an APA 
case and “a court should not be required to guess at whether or not it has the complete administrative 
record”) and Pitman v. USCIS, Case No. 2:17-cv-166, 2017 WL 5991738, at *2 (D. Utah Dec. 1, 
2017) (“Rather than rely on Defendants’ assertions of what was in the record or Plaintiffs’ alleged 
concessions, the court must undertake its own review of the administrative record as a whole.”).  
Failing to allow Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 12(b)(1)–(2) motions appears to neuter the provision of § 706 
that establishes the object of review as the “the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party.”  
United States v. Menendez, 48 F.3d 1401, 1409 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that that phrase did not ob-
viate the government’s obligation to furnish the record because under 5 U.S.C. § 559, the APA does 
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these motions are pending, a petitioner might be able to obtain discovery 
on a limited, discrete topic such as irreparable harm for preliminary in-
junction purposes,352 but that discovery should not bleed into the merits 
and become impermissible record supplementation. 
After surviving Rule 12, petitioners can use the summary-judgment 
mechanism of Rule 56. 353  It should be irrelevant if the district practice is 
to call the filing a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings or a 
“motion to set aside,” to require the parties to simply file “briefs,”354 or 
to treat the initial pleading as a dispositive motion in and of itself, so 
long as the timing rules are observed.  That is, courts should not require 
the record to be furnished until the agency has had a chance to lodge 
threshold defenses with no traditional discovery in the meantime.  Never-
theless, some districts specify that the appropriate vehicle for resolving 
the merits of an APA dispute is cross-motions for summary judgment 
under Rule 56. 
For preliminary injunctive relief or a temporary restraining order un-
der Rule 65, the usual rule likely applies: a party is not expected to prove 
its whole case on a Rule 65 motion.355  A party might be able to obtain 
expedited discovery in advance of a preliminary injunction hearing, per-
haps to address issues collateral to the record such as irreparable harm 
and the balance of the equities.356  However, this discovery should not 
supplement the record, and thus should not be considered in the merits 
                                                            
not limit the additional requirements imposed by other statutes, and that case featured additional re-
quirements imposed by the Endangered Species Act). 
 352.   In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443; Coal. for Underground Expansion, 333 F.3d at 198; 
Pennsylvania v. Trump, Civil Action No. 17-4540, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (permitting 
evidence from outside the administrative record to demonstrate irreparable harm, the public interest, 
and the balance of equities, among other exceptions) appeal filed, Feb. 15, 2018. 
 353.   FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d); see, e.g., D. ALASKA LR 16.3(c) (requiring an APA plaintiff to file a 
motion for summary judgment within 30 days after the agency record is filed). 
 354.   See, e.g., D. KAN. L.R. 83.7.1(d) (requiring an APA plaintiff to file a “brief” within forty-
five days after the agency record is filed); D. UTAH DUCIVR 7-4 (establishing a whole regime of 
APA-specific case procedures). 
 355.   FED. R. CIV. P. 65; Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (citations omit-
ted) (“[A] preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less for-
mal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.  A party thus is not required to 
prove his case in full at a preliminary-injunction hearing, and the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law made by a court granting a preliminary injunction are not binding at trial on the merits.”). 
 356.   E.g., Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty./Kan. City v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., No. 11-
2400, 2012 WL 602838, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 24, 2012) (acknowledging that some issues raised by a 
preliminary injunction motion, such as irreparable injury and the balance of harm, “are not likely to 
be addressed in an agency’s administrative record,” thus “under certain circumstances, some limited 
discovery might be appropriate to clarify the harm a party might suffer if an injunction were en-
tered,” but finding it unnecessary in that case); Meritain Health Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., No. 
4:12-CV-266, 2012 WL 1320147, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 17, 2012) (discussing, in a non-APA con-
text, the standards for granting expedited discovery in advance of a preliminary injunction hearing). 
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inquiry.357 
If a petitioner wants completion of the record, then he or she can file 
a motion styled to that effect.  Agencies should be able to file a motion 
for a protective order barring impermissible discovery,358 especially if 
discovery would force the disclosure of sensitive information carefully 
restricted by federal law,359 or if the record includes material that does 
not rise to the level of privilege, but is sensitive nonetheless (for exam-
ple, it is law-enforcement sensitive).360 
F. Remedies for Difficult Completion 
If a court finds that the record is incomplete and the agency cannot 
easily provide the missing information, then the remedy should be for the 
court to remand to the agency to reformat the administrative record it 
submits for judicial review.  The remedy should not be discovery into 
whether the record is complete. 
Discovery is inappropriate in this situation because nothing in the 
Overton Park line of Supreme Court cases endorses discovery.  At most, 
a district court may hold a hearing after it finds the agency has not pre-
sented the court with the complete record before the agency at the time it 
made its decision.361  In Overton Park, a hearing in district court was the 
remedy ordered because the agency had egregiously failed to produce 
any record in litigation and it likely would be unable to do so.362  But 
even then, the optimal course of action is to remand to the agency, where 
additional facts can be added to the record in the ordinary course of 
agency business.363 
This remedy also works in “blended” cases where the court is unable 
                                                            
 357.   Nat’l Ass’n of Mortg. Brokers v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 770 F. Supp. 2d 
283, 288–89 (D.D.C. 2011) (granting a petitioner’s motion for expedited discovery in advance of 
filing a preliminary injunction motion, but only ordering the agency to produce the administrative 
record on an expedited basis, given the rule barring discovery in APA lawsuits). 
 358.   E.g., Harvard Pilgrim Health Care of New Eng. v. Thompson, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3, 13 
(D.R.I. 2004). 
 359.   E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012 & Supp. V 2017) (information relating to asylum applica-
tions). 
 360.   See Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (relying on “law enforcement sen-
sitive” information in determining whether to set aside agency action under the APA). 
 361.   See supra Section II.F. 
 362.   Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971); abrogated on oth-
er grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
 363.   See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973) (remanding to obtain information from agen-
cy additional explanation for its decision); Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and 
the Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553 (2014). 
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to discern whether the agency decision satisfies the substantive standard 
of review, either because the agency’s record is deficient or the agency’s 
decision-making is deficient.  We argue this is the “bare record” problem 
Overton Park incorrectly identified as purely a records problem.364  If a 
court cannot conduct the appropriate review on the merits of the adminis-
trative record presented, then the court should grant the APA review peti-
tion per 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)365 or per § 706(2),366 and remand so the agen-
cy can reformat its decision after it is set aside by the court.367  This is the 
usual remedy when the merits, not the record, are at issue368: the “reme-
                                                            
 364.   Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420. 
 365.   5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (allowing courts to compel agency action that is “unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed”). 
 366.   5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012) (allowing courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” agency action 
meeting the statutory criteria). 
 367.   Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985); e.g., Routson v. Zinke, No. 
CV-15-8286, 2017 WL 4268907, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2017) (remanding to the Bureau of 
Land Management for further consideration and denying petitioners’ request to supplement or com-
plete the record on review when the district court, which was apparently conversant in challenges to 
the Bureau of Land Management’s denials of applications to correct land patents, could not deter-
mine material facts about the denial at issue sufficient to conduct APA review); Beach Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. FCC, 959 F.2d 975, 987–88 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (remanding, but stating that the court has discre-
tion to choose between supplementation at the federal court and remand); Muwekma Ohlone Tribe 
v. Kempthorne, 452 F. Supp. 2d 105, 124 (D.D.C. 2006); Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 
1029 n.10 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Normally, if an Agency’s administrative record is incomplete, we would 
expect litigants to seek to supplement the record in the agency before seeking to expand the record 
before the district court.” (emphasis added)); Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species 
Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1549 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that it has discretion to choose between sup-
plementation and remand, and choosing remand so the agency and the petitioner could have a “vig-
orous and thorough” adversarial evidentiary hearing); In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of 
Blunt, 358 F. Supp. 2d 882, 893 (D.N.D. 2005) (stating that supplementation should be chosen over 
remand only in “rare instances”); Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1276 
(D. Colo. 2010); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983) (remand-
ing for the agency to reformat where record appeared complete). 
However, most courts that believe record deficiencies should be cured by supplementation prefer to 
do it in federal court, without calling it discovery.  In other words, judicial actions like those this 
Article believes are inconsistent with the APA usually entail wanting the supplementation to happen 
in federal court.  E.g., Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1245 (E.D. Cal. 
2013).  This may depend on how discrete the supplemented evidence is; if it is readily identified 
documents, then perhaps it makes sense to do it in federal court.  See Water Supply & Storage Co. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 910 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1269 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 368.   E.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Under 
the APA reviewing courts generally limit themselves to remanding for further consideration an 
agency order wanting an explanation adequate to sustain it.”); Zzyym v. Kerry, 220 F. Supp. 3d 
1106, 1114 (D. Colo. 2016) (“I find that the administrative record, as supplemented by the Fellows 
declaration, does not show that the decisionmaking process that resulted in the policy in question 
was rational.  That is not to say that it can’t be done, but the Department’s first effort to get over the 
arbitrary and capricious hump was not convincing.  The Court remands the matter to the Department 
for reconsideration.”); INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 13, 16 (2002) (“Generally speaking, a court 
of appeals should have remanded a case to an agency for a decision of a matter that statutes placed 
primarily in agency hands.”).  Contra United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134, 178 (5th Cir. 2015) (cit-
ing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012)) (stating that the proper remedy for failing to adhere to notice and 
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dial purist” perspective.369 
After remand, if the record truly was deficient, the agency could re-
ceive additional evidence.  The agency could then write a stronger deci-
sion, if the problem was that the federal court could not find a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made—a “State 
Farm” problem.370  The agency could also act favorably toward petition-
ers, addressing grievances outside of the dispute resolution mechanisms 
of Articles I and III.  Throughout, the petitioner should have to make a 
showing of prejudice, per 5 U.S.C. § 706, which cautions courts that 
“due account shall be taken for the rule of prejudicial error” in APA re-
view.371 
Relatedly, courts should remand upon request from the agency.372  
This saves judicial and agency resources where the agency knows that an 
administrative record is deficient or is concerned that a court, for what-
ever reason, will not agree that the administrative record is complete.  
                                                            
comment is to “set aside” and “enjoin” the agency action), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. 
Ct. 2271 (2016).  See Bagley, supra note 67, at 255 (examining “administrative law’s systematic 
inattention to remedial questions”). 
 369.   Bagley, supra note 67, at 257–58 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflec-
tions on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199, 223)).  One scholar, 
responding to Professor Bagley’s article, has argued that the remedial purist perspective’s “current 
rule-based approach of the ordinary remand rule better accounts for [a] distrust” of the administra-
tive state.  Christopher J. Walker, Against Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117 COL. L. 
REV. ONLINE 106, 110 (2017). 
 370.   See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43 (holding that courts must determine whether 
the agency has examined all relevant data and articulated a sufficient connection between the data 
and its decision). 
 371.   5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (“[In an APA case,] 
the burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s 
determination.”); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969) (emphasizing that 
Chenery “does not require that we convert judicial review of agency action into a ping-pong game,” 
and that remand is not required where it “would be an idle and useless formality”); ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 41, at 110 (stating that 5 U.S.C. § 706 merely “sums up in succinct 
fashion the ‘harmless error’ rule applied by the courts in the review of lower court decisions as well 
as of administrative bodies”).  Some organic statutes have a stronger harmless-error rule.  E.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 9613(j)(4) (2012) (allowing the court to “disallow costs or damages only if the errors were 
so serious and related to matters of such central relevance to the action that the action would have 
been significantly changed had such errors not been made”).  There is some perceived tension be-
tween Chenery and 5 U.S.C. § 706’s “prejudicial error” safety valve, but like the Supreme Court 
discussed in Mass. Trs. of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 248 (1964), 
Chenery should be applied when the error “bear[s] on the procedure used or the substance of deci-
sion reached.”  See also Bagley, supra note 67, at 302–07 (“Chenery in the trenches is not as abso-
lute as Chenery in the casebooks.”). 
 372.   Calif. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. U.S. E.P.A., 688 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2012) (“General-
ly, courts only refuse voluntarily requested remand when the agency’s request is frivolous or made 
in bad faith.”); but see Lutheran Church–Mo. Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(refusing to remand upon request because the request was found to be simply a tactic to avoid judi-
cial review). 
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Theoretically, if a petitioner remains dissatisfied, he or she could file a 
new APA action presuming that the six-year limitations period has not 
run.373 
If the items to be completed are narrowly circumscribed and easy for 
the agency to submit in federal court, then a court might simply retain 
jurisdiction while the agency tries to fix whatever problem (merits or 
record) the court has identified.374  But, a court should generally send the 
case back down to the agency and not involve itself in the intricacies of 
how the record is completed.  Ultimately, either option will not have 
much of an effect on incentivizing agencies to improve their behavior in 
the future.375 
When remanding to agencies, courts possess and exercise the free-
dom to retain jurisdiction over a petition while the remand occurs.376  
Admittedly, there does not appear to be a mechanism in the APA to re-
mand without actually vacating or setting aside the decision; that is, a 
mechanism to remand to the agency while the federal court retains juris-
diction to re-review.  Rather, it would suggest that the court must invali-
date the agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 706, enter judgment, and dis-
charge its jurisdiction.377  Then, the petitioner would need to re-enter the 
                                                            
 373.   See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2012) (setting the APA statute of limitations). 
 374.   Cf. Bagley, supra note 67, at 299 & 302 (arguing that remedial purism does not make 
much sense when a federal court upon APA review remands to the agency to do an easy fix that may 
simply lead to a round trip back to the court). 
 375.   Cf. Bagley, supra note 67, at 318 (arguing that by insisting on remand and vacatur or by 
refusing to take account of harmless error, courts are not making the agency better at applying the 
appropriate standards in the future.  “In general, however, the courts should abandon the appealing 
but unlikely assumption that mechanically rebuking agencies for their errors will improve agency 
decisionmaking so much that the costs are worth bearing.”). 
 376.   E.g., Wood v. Burwell, 837 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting the district court’s decision to 
retain jurisdiction and citing district courts’ equitable power to do so during an agency remand; also 
noting that in Social Security review actions, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) specifically prohibits courts from 
retaining jurisdiction during certain statutory prescribed remands); Baystate Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 587 
F. Supp. 2d 37, 41 (D.D.C. 2008) (recognizing the court’s “discretion to retain jurisdiction over a 
case pending completion of a remand and to order the filing of progress reports,” but noting that 
“this discretion is typically reserved for cases alleging unreasonable delay of agency action or failure 
to comply with a statutory deadline, or for cases involving a history of agency noncompliance with 
court orders or resistance to fulfillment of legal duties”); Wyandotte Nation v. Salazar, 939 F. Supp. 
2d 1137, 1153–54 (D. Kan. 2013) (retaining jurisdiction); Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1109 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (affirming a district court decision in the non-APA context that remanded to the 
agency but retained jurisdiction to ensure compliance.  “While a court’s retaining of jurisdiction of 
five years may be unusual, federal courts regularly retain jurisdiction until a federal agency has 
complied with its legal obligations, and have the authority to compel regular progress reports in the 
meantime.”).  If the parties stipulate to a remand under certain conditions, the court may retain juris-
diction by incorporating those conditions into its order of dismissal.  See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardi-
an Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994). 
 377.   See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012) (directing a court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings, and conclusions” that fail the APA’s standards of review). 
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administrative process and re-exhaust remedies.  Hewing to that con-
servative approach has the virtue of a bright-line rule. 
However, several courts hold that it “is simply not the law” that a 
court must set aside an agency action that violates the APA with no room 
for judicial discretion in the matter.378  Many courts hold they have dis-
cretion to remand for further explanation without setting aside or order-
ing vacatur.379  Indeed, both Overton Park380 and Lorion381 pointedly re-
manded their cases upon determining that the record presented was not 
“the whole record.”  This is consistent with the power to remand a case 
found in pre-APA equitable judicial powers.382 
In electing to remand the case, a court has no authority to order spe-
cific relief under the APA.383  Therefore, when a district court entertain-
ing an APA challenge concludes that an administrative record is defi-
cient, in addition to declining to add evidence in court via discovery, the 
                                                            
 378.   See, e.g., Sugar Cane Growers Coop. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 379.   See, e.g., A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“In deciding 
whether to vacate an agency’s decision pending further explanation, we consider ‘the seriousness of 
the order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and the 
disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed.’” (citations omitted)); 
Wood, 837 F.3d at 976 (“[T]he factors courts weigh when deciding whether to remand to an agency 
without vacatur: (1) ‘how serious the agency’s errors are’ and (2) ‘the disruptive consequences of an 
interim change that may itself be changed.’” (quoting Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA., 688 F.3d 
989, 992 (9th Cir. 2012))); Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 781 F.3d 
1271, 1289 (11th Cir. 2015) (declining to vacate because it could not conclude that the error was 
truly significant or that the conclusion was unlawful).  However, there appears to be an intra-circuit 
split in the D.C. Circuit regarding the lawfulness of remand without vacatur.  See In re Core 
Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Griffith, J., concurring); NRDC v. EPA, 489 
F.3d 1250, 1262–64 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Randolph, J., concurring); see also Checkosky v. SEC, 23 
F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (opinion of Silberman, J. supporting the practice of remand without vaca-
tur, and opinion of Randolph, J. arguing that remand without vacatur violates the APA), superseded 
on other grounds, Marrie v. SEC, 374 F.3d 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  However, the “prejudicial error” 
clause of 5 U.S.C. § 706 provides a statutory grounding for remand without vacatur.  Bagley, supra 
note 67, at 257. 
 380.   Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (holding that be-
cause the administrative record was not before the Court, “it is necessary to remand this case”), ab-
rogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
 381.   Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) (“If the record before the 
agency does not support the agency action, if the agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if 
the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record 
before it, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional 
investigation or explanation.” (emphasis added)). 
 382.   Duffy, supra note 87, at 129 n.76 (citing Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 
187 U.S. 94, 107–11 (1902); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364, 373 (1939)). 
 383.   Compare Cnty. of L.A. v. Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[Under the 
APA, upon determining] that an agency made an error of law, the court’s inquiry is at an end: the 
case must be remanded to the agency for further action consistent with the corrected legal stand-
ards. . . . Not only was it unnecessary for the court [below] to retain jurisdiction to devise a specific 
remedy for the Secretary to follow, but it was error to do so.” (citations omitted)), with Alvarado 
Cmty. Hosp. v. Shalala, 155 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998) (ordering specific relief). 
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court should refuse to order the completion or supplementation of specif-
ic materials upon remand. 
Moreover, remand without vacatur (as opposed to simple invalida-
tion of the agency action) could be inefficient for the agency and peti-
tioner to take their dispute out of federal court with the prospect of later 
returning, especially if the court is ordering the agency to enter just one 
or two pieces of evidence.384  Remand without vacatur discourages the 
proper, efficient interpretation of the APA.  It also exposes the agency to 
liability for fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act385 
when it otherwise would not be. 
Courts should remand to produce the record.  This gives the agency a 
chance to show that “the whole record” exists; the agency just failed to 
come up with it or compile it initially.  The agency would also retain the 
freedom to render a new action based on the existing record, whether or 
not the record proffered was indeed “the whole record.”  (Note, however, 
that the decisionmaker would have to limit her review to the materials in 
the record proffered to federal court.)  This is consistent with Supreme 
Court cases requiring lower courts to “uphold a decision of less than ide-
al clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.”386 
 
IV. HOW THE APA RECORD RULE IS BEING INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED 
BY SOME COURTS AND LITIGANTS 
Enterprising petitioners have been able to accomplish two things in 
actions for APA review.  First, they have been able to engage in discov-
ery with the agency.  Second, they have sometimes succeeded at adding 
materials to the administrative record—and thus the judicial record—for 
substantive consideration.  In other words, many courts are not taking the 
administrative record as presented, and they are doing so well beyond the 
limited exceptions identified above. 
                                                            
 384.   See A.L. Pharma, Inc., 62 F.3d 1484, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 385.   28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2012) (applying this explicitly to “proceedings for judicial 
review of agency action”). 
 386.   FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–14 (2009) (discussing APA gov-
erning principles) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 
(1974)). 
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A. Why Some APA Petitioners and Courts Are Not Following the 
Record Rule 
Before discussing where litigants and courts go astray, it is revealing 
to understand the reasons litigants and courts have for avoiding—
consciously or unconsciously—the proper scope of the APA record rule 
we have delineated.  Petitioners are incentivized to advocate for expand-
ing the administrative record beyond its appropriate scope for a number 
of reasons.  Principally this may be done to increase the odds of winning; 
adding non-record or unredacted record materials before the federal court 
gives them a second bite at the apple.387  A petitioner is before a federal 
court because he or she has lost before the agency.  If a petitioner chal-
lenges the record presented by the agency to the court, arguing the ad-
ministrative record should include more materials, then the petitioner 
presumably expects the materials to be beneficial to his case.  In 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A) arbitrary and capricious review, the petitioner could high-
light allegedly relevant factors that the agency did not consider, reveal 
internal inconsistencies that are unexplained, reveal generally normative 
behavior that could be misconstrued as bad faith or improper behavior, 
induce an agency to settle an action by shifting the agency’s risk toler-
ance, gain access to data that is not otherwise available under the Free-
dom of Information Act, and exploit human error in the privilege review 
or Freedom of Information Act release contexts.  Petitioners may plausi-
bly also want to erode deferential arbitrary and capricious standard in fa-
vor of de novo review,388 even though Congress considered and rejected 
that option before the APA’s passage.389 
Discovery may also serve the goals of petitioners, especially organi-
zational petitioners, to discover fodder for future lawsuits.  This may aid 
such petitioners whether in a larger class action or a small case under, 
say, the Federal Tort Claims Act or for a constitutional violation under 
                                                            
 387.   In receiving a second opportunity for favorable agency action, an APA petitioner’s odds 
do not necessarily increase.  See Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, Agency Behavior and 
Discretion on Remand, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 483, 484–87 (2017) (noting how an agency 
may simply rule against the petitioner again on remand and identifying “four variables that may hold 
predictive value as to agencies’ exercise of discretion following judicial remand: the nature of the 
remedy; the timeline; the valence of the decision; and the presidential administration”). 
 388.   Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Were the federal courts 
routinely or liberally to admit new evidence when reviewing agency decisions, it would be obvious 
that the federal courts would be proceeding, in effect, de novo rather than with the proper deference 
to agency processes, expertise, and decision-making.”). 
 389.   See supra note 104; see also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36–37 (1950), 
superseded by statute as stated by 502 U.S. 129 (1991).  Of course, we are not referring to 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(F) de novo review.  See supra note 183. 
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Bivens.390  Impermissible record expansion through an APA lawsuit 
serves as a sort of unique discovery to tee up such cases. 
A more cynical view holds that forcing the unwarranted disclosure of 
documents helps aggrieved individuals harass the agency.  This can be 
done to slow down the agency’s work and effectively enjoin agency 
functions for policy or political goals, with the possibility of securing at-
torneys’ fees391 in the process.  Pressing the agency for discovery, with 
the added benefit of loudly clamoring when discovery is not immediately 
available or when discovery yields tantalizing materials, can also gener-
ate favorable press for issue advocates.  Advocacy groups can then par-
lay that press into fundraising.  Ironically, one reason President Truman 
vetoed the Walter-Logan Bill, a law that would have provided less defer-
ential judicial review, was because he thought it was the work of lawyers 
“who desire to have all processes of government conducted through law-
suits.”392  Even when untoward motives are not certain, these types of 
records disputes have infected several lawsuits that are high profile be-
cause of their merits, thus risking the conflation between records issues 
and merits issues.393 
Petitioners accomplish these goals in a number of ways.  As the 
foregoing indicates, while the APA’s “whole record” requirement does 
have a readily discernible meaning, there is considerable confusion over 
the scope of APA record review.  The bench and bar alike confuse both 
the administrative “record” and the judicial “record” created and refer-
enced in litigation, and the completion/supplementation distinction.394  
                                                            
 390.   Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 391.   See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2012). 
 392.   Croley, supra note 105. 
 393.   See, e.g., In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017) (challenge to DACA); Motion in 
Limine to Limit Evidence at PI Hearing, Pennsylvania v. Trump, Civil Action No. 17-4540, ECF 
No. 48 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2017) (in a challenge to the Affordable Care Act regulations exempting 
religious organizations from providing contraceptive services, moving to prohibit supplementation 
of the administrative record; the motion was summarily denied); Further Supplemental Joint Case 
Management Statement, Gill v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 3:14-cv-3120, ECF No. 71 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 
2015) (challenge to the Department of Justice’s Suspicious Active Reporting program, alleged to be 
a vast domestic intelligence network); Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order, Premier Med. 
Supplies, Inc. v. Leavitt, Case No. 1:07-CV-3809, ECF No. 18, (N.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2008) (chal-
lenge to Medicare regulations); Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos Varios v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 606 F. Supp. 2d 59, 68–69 (D.D.C. 2009) (in a challenge to an aspect of the 
embargo on Cuban entities registering or renewing U.S. trademarks, defending the government’s 
inclusion of a declaration as background information that was not impermissible extra-record evi-
dence); Brief for Respondents in Opposition, Holy Land Found. v. Ashcroft, No. 03-775 (U.S. 2003) 
(in a challenge to Specially Designated Global Terrorist designation which blocked monetary trans-
actions involving the plaintiff’s property, noting a prior supplementation dispute). 
 394.   Young, supra note 121; Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Jackson, 856 F. Supp. 2d 150, 159 (D.D.C. 
2012) (declining to supplement the record with four documents, but agreeing to view them apart 
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To a large extent, that is understandable.  Judges and advocates are often 
most familiar with the default rules of traditional civil discovery, which 
the APA transcends in several key aspects.  A court may also order the 
parties to meet and confer regarding whether the administrative record 
should be supplemented, thrusting the issue into solely the parties’ do-
main.395  Judges may have a general judicial distrust of agencies.396  
Some argue that judges and the parties possibly may believe that having 
too much discovery is a harmless error, or be otherwise ignorant of the 
significance of this issue.397 
Confusion in this sphere is not solely attributable to judges’ possible 
prejudices or inability to grapple with a slight variation on the law.  The 
APA does not define “the whole record” or say when “the whole record” 
can or cannot be completed or supplemented.  Nor was Overton Park 
meant to bear the weight that judges and parties seeking APA guidance 
place on it, especially regarding remedies.  Its dicta can be vexing and 
misleading.398  For instance, Overton Park endorsed discovery—
including depositions of high-ranking officials—as a possible remedy, 
which is inappropriate for the reasons discussed earlier.399  To its credit, 
the Supreme Court moved away from that in Camp v. Pitts, saying an 
agency could not only offer affidavits and testimony, but give “such ad-
ditional explanation of the reasons for the agency decision as may prove 
necessary.”400  Camp emphasized that this did not need to occur in the 
                                                            
from the APA record as “extra-record evidence,” without explaining the significance of that distinc-
tion); WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 n.4 (D.D.C. 2009) (conflating comple-
tion and supplementation and calling both “supplementation”); La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Fed. 
Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 141 F. Supp. 3d 681, 694 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (calling completion “sup-
plementation” and supplementation “extra-record evidence”). 
 395.   E.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hargan, 285 F. Supp. 3d 397, 402–403 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 396.   See Bagley, supra note 67, at 315 (“Judges of whatever political stripe are acculturated 
into a legal community that views the administrative state as a leviathan that can be tamed only 
through zealous judicial oversight.  There’s no substantial constituency clamoring about the serious 
costs of that attitude.”). 
 397.   See Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get 
It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 2 (1996) (“[S]ome of the time, the Justices just don’t get it.  After 50 
years of the APA, many things should be clearer than they are.”). 
 398.   See id. at 3 (taking aim at Overton Park, but on different grounds than those challenged 
here, “Beyond neglect, the Court befogs APA concepts by sloppy and bloated opinions, which leave 
confusion in their wake.  The Court’s most hurtful sin is its pervasive imprecision.  Too often, even 
sound holdings are accompanied by gratuitous and ill-considered dicta that are susceptible to damag-
ing misapplication.” (citation omitted)); see also, e.g., In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371, 373–74 
(Breyer, J., dissenting from grant of stay) (arguing that when Overton Park stated that it would ac-
cept the record presented by the agency, it really meant the record presented by the agency pro-
ceedings, thus the court, not the agency, was the ultimate arbiter of the record’s contents), remanded, 
138 S. Ct. 443. 
 399.   See infra Section III.F. 
 400.   Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973).  
66 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
federal litigation—it should occur on remand.401  Lorion reinforced that 
remand to the agency is “the proper course, except in rare circumstanc-
es.”402  But these cases never explicitly repudiated Overton Park’s lan-
guage on this point.  So whatever unintended gaps or secondary conse-
quences Overton Park may have created with its general terms, the 
Supreme Court has not taken up the issue anew to address them, even 
when it had “whole record” issues before it in fall 2017.403 
The record rule progenitor, Overton Park, also has narrow utility be-
cause it dealt with a very specific scenario: the complete absence of a 
record, which could not be saved by the Secretary’s post hoc justifica-
tions, which ran afoul of Chenery I.  As Camp showed, if the agency pre-
sents the bare minimum necessary to qualify as a “record”—any explana-
tion, even a “curt” one, that demonstrates some reason for the final action 
taken—then there is no ground to supplement the record.404  Rather, the 
question becomes legal: on that record, was the agency’s action arbitrary 
and capricious, and so forth.405  Insofar as there are issues with the curt 
explanation, a substantive inquiry must be conducted that asks whether 
there is a rational connection between the facts found and the conclu-
sions reached.  The substantive inquiry also must ask whether the dispute 
should be resolved not by augmenting the record but by conducting a 
State Farm merits inquiry.406  Even then, Overton Park did not permit the 
record to be supplemented.407  It simply remanded to the lower courts to 
oversee the completion of the record.408  Further, Overton Park estab-
lished, without full discussion or elaboration, a “bad faith” exception 
where petitioners can obtain discovery even where a record is made and 
presented.409 
Moreover, the record rule is not faithfully followed in the federal dis-
trict courts because of the theoretical difficulties meshing record review 
with 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) cases in which an agency unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed action.  In such cases, “there is no final agency ac-
tion to demarcate the limits of the record.”410  But 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) cas-
                                                            
 401.   Id.  
 402.   Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). 
 403.   In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371 (2017). 
 404.   Camp, 411 U.S. at 142. 
 405.   See, e.g., id. 
 406.   Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 407.   Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971); abrogated on 
other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
 408.   Id. 
 409.   Id.  
 410.   Friends of the Clearwater v. Dombeck, 222 F.3d 552, 560 (9th Cir. 2000); see also CCL, 
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es are the equivalent of mandamus claims, which present purely legal is-
sues and do not need an administrative record to review the agency’s un-
lawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed action.411  As the Supreme 
Court’s 2017 and 2018 decisions In re United States and In re Depart-
ment of Commerce show a writ of mandamus is still a viable avenue for 
relief.412 
Finally, APA petitioners are able to circumvent the record rule for 
practical considerations.  The record may look different in every case, 
making it tough for the bench and bar to ascertain what a record in a giv-
en APA case “should” look like.  This is especially relevant with judges 
who do not often adjudicate APA records disputes and who do not real-
ize that administrative records are generally consistent in different clas-
ses of adjudications.  Further, the petitioners’ equities may be compel-
ling.  Petitioners may complain that only the government has access to 
all the documents, so they should be able to find out whether the agency 
considered something that is not in the presented record.  This was a fac-
tor in the DACA litigation, where the district judge insisted on proceed-
ing to discovery notwithstanding the unresolved jurisdictional threshold 
defenses because of the impending end to the DACA program, which the 
judge pointed out would adversely affect thousands of immigrants.413  
These attractive qualities often overpower the legal reasons for narrowly 
defining and handling “the whole record” in APA judicial review. 
B. How Some APA Petitioners and Courts Are Not Following the 
Record Rule 
APA petitioners succeed in a number of ways in going beyond what 
the record rule should permit.  The sieve is not in a single place; petition-
ers may take advantage of any of the myriad circuit splits and hazy 
standards described above.  APA petitioners may also argue that discov-
                                                            
Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 780, 791 (1997) (“[When] the government is being sued for inac-
tion . . . [t]here is less reason to presume that the record assembled by the agency is presumptively 
complete.”). 
 411.   See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004) (“APA carried forward 
the traditional practice . . . when judicial review was achieved through . . . mandamus”); S.F. 
Baykeeper v. Whitman, 297 F.3d 877, 886 (9th Cir. 2002) (“EPA does not presently have a statutory 
duty to act.  Therefore, there can be no unreasonable delay . . . .”); Mt. Emmons Mining Co. v. Bab-
bitt, 117 F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 1997).  But see Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 
502, 511, 507 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997) (in a 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) case, the Solicitor of Labor submitted a 
declaration to defeat a TRAC factors argument). 
 412.   In re Dep’t of Commerce, No. 18A375, 2018 WL 5259090 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2018); In re 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017). 
 413.   In re United States, 138 S. Ct. at 445. 
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ery must be completed or supplemented; which again, courts are not con-
sistent on terminology and often conflate the two.  They may make con-
stitutional or “non-APA” claims challenging agency action, claiming ex-
emption from the record rule.414  This may be especially likely if 
petitioners can take advantage of the mushy standard used in some cir-
cuits: all materials considered “indirectly” by the agency.415  Petitioners 
may encourage courts to use discovery to conduct any completion or 
supplementation, instead of remanding to the agency (regardless of vaca-
tur or retention of jurisdiction).416  Of course, if an agency finds itself in 
discovery, discovery must be “proportional to the needs of the case” per 
the usual discovery rules.417 
Courts often entertain the petitioners’ arguments because the courts 
see themselves as the ultimate arbiter of whether the administrative rec-
ord is complete.418  That is a fair view, so long as they credit the pre-
sumption of agency regularity in compiling the administrative record.  
But because courts fear that an agency can omit unfavorable documents 
from the record, they sometimes want to look beyond the record present-
ed to ensure that they have the whole record.419  This may be an even 
greater issue in 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) delay cases, where the record falls 
within less conventional bounds.  By subjecting an agency to record 
completion or supplementation, a court may also—whether intentionally 
or not—affect the agency’s decision to settle. 
                                                            
 414.   See supra note 274. 
 415.   See supra note 216. 
 416.   E.g., Little Co. of Mary Hosp. v. Sebelius, 587 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 417.   FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 418.   Tenneco Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 475 F. Supp. 299, 317 (D. Del. 1979) (“DOE may not 
unilaterally determine what shall constitute the administrative record and thereby limit the scope of 
this Court’s inquiry.”); Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 740 (10th Cir. 1993); Am. Farm 
Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, Civil No. 1:11-CV-67, 2011 WL 6826539, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2011) 
(“[N]otwithstanding this presumption in favor of EPA, EPA does not have complete control over the 
contents of the administrative record.”). 
 419.   Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 2011 WL 6826539, at *3 (using this reasoning to go on a hunt, 
intact presumption of regularity notwithstanding, for irregularities in the administrative record pre-
sented); but see supra note 240 and the cases cited therein.  Some scholarship alleges that agencies 
affirmatively omit unfavorable documents from the administrative record in federal court.  Saul, su-
pra note 203, at 1326 (“Increasingly, federal agencies are misusing the deliberative process privilege 
by failing to properly assert and justify the privilege. . . . [Litigants] must frequently resort to Mo-
tions to Compel Completion of the Administrative Record when it becomes apparent that the de-
fendant agency has withheld documents from the record.” (citations omitted)); Rohlf, supra note 78, 
at 576, 576 n.10 (2009) (“Particularly during the tenure of George W. Bush, the federal Executive 
Branch placed a high premium on secrecy in many of its dealings, a philosophy that manifested itself 
in part as a trend toward increasingly skimpier records filed with reviewing courts pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedure Act (‘APA’) when decisions made by federal agencies were challenged.” 
(internal footnote omitted)). 
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When a court rules against an agency in an APA case, the remedies 
have varied.  Some courts have proceeded to manage discovery, like 
compelling the testimony of agency officials, either in post-decision writ-
ten statements or through live testimony at a hearing.420  This has post-
hoc, Chenery I issues, although courts have tried to distinguish Chenery 
I.421  Other courts set aside the rule because of the deficient record and 
proceed no further.422  These methods are at odds with the ideal remedies 
available when agency action presents a record or merits issue.423 
C. Negative Consequences of Misapplying the Record Rule 
Misapplying the APA record rule in judicial review carries several 
secondary consequences that may not be apparent in any individual case.  
Primarily, imposing superfluous burdens on the agencies wastes re-
sources and shifts expenditure away from core agency functions.424  This 
waste of tax dollars is compounded by the occasional need to contract 
outside technical services to engage in the surplus discovery. 
Completion and supplementation also waste time.  The process of 
challenging and defending agency action already takes a long time, as it 
spans the agency decision-making itself, administrative appeals of that 
action, federal district court review, and then “duplication of the identical 
task . . . in the court of appeals.”425  Even when the record contents are 
                                                            
 420.   See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971), abrogated 
on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domeni-
co Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (ordering the deposition of a con-
tracting officer in lieu of remand because the decision being challenged was so personal to the of-
ficer); Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 83 F.3d 1497, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (“[T]his court has on occasion flexed the record requirement to allow the admission of agency 
declarations that merely illuminate reasons obscured but implicit in the administrative record.” (cita-
tions omitted)).  The Consumer Federation court did not identify its authority to “flex” the APA’s 
and Overton Park’s requirements, but its decision ultimately did reject an agency official’s litigation 
affidavit as falling on the “post hoc” side of the line.  Consumer Fed’n of Am., 83 F.3d at 1507. 
 421.   Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 514–15 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(“[The agency’s] responsibility includes providing reasons for its actions sufficient to permit as-
sessment by a reviewing court.  Most assuredly, however, this responsibility does not oblige the 
agency to provide exhaustive, contemporaneous legal arguments to preemptively defend its action.” 
(citations omitted)); Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 511–12 (9th Cir. 1997) (ex-
cusing a post hoc rationalization in a § 706(1) action because the agency never had the opportunity 
to make a statement of its policy and justifications). 
 422.   BECK, supra note 35, at 78–79; Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 
988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“The decision whether to vacate depends on the seriousness 
of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and the 
disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed.” (citations omitted)). 
 423.   See supra Section III.E. 
 424.   See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 67, at 318; Davis, supra note 190. 
 425.   Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). 
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not challenged, the agency must ascertain the circuit’s standards for “the 
whole record,” search for responsive documents in accordance with those 
standards, exclude deliberative process materials (if the circuit permits 
such), redact for privilege, and create a log.  The need to brief issues sur-
rounding the record prolongs the dispute between the parties, and the 
agency may need to repeat part of this process if the court orders the 
agency to supplement the record with new materials. 
The toll on agencies is apparent from Overton Park itself.  On re-
mand from the Supreme Court, the district court held a twenty-five-day 
trial with 240 exhibits.426  In a recent case, the district court ordered the 
agency to produce deliberative process materials.427  The agency had to 
apply thirty-one broad search terms to the records of seventeen different 
email custodians over a twenty-three-year period, which required review 
of over 400,000 pages, which would take over a year under current staff-
ing levels.428  In the DACA mandamus case, even though the government 
succeeded in securing a stay on record completion and supplementation 
pending a ruling on threshold jurisdictional defenses, the agencies and 
Department of Justice counsel had to spend time brief-writing because 
the case was appealed first to the Ninth Circuit and then to the Supreme 
Court, where the agencies filed multiple briefs.429  This was not neces-
sarily a function of over-lawyering the case.  In remanding the case, the 
Supreme Court explicitly stated that if the jurisdictional arguments are 
denied, the lower courts should consider whether the agencies meet the 
standards for interlocutory appeal.430 
Improper construction of the record rule also exacts costs at the indi-
vidual level.  Employees of the agencies must divert their attention to 
these unpredictable and unexpected record issues.  Agency officials’ time 
is expended in depositions.  In the DACA litigation, where 30,000 doc-
uments were ordered to be produced in a matter of days, a government 
attorney reported at oral argument that “[o]ne out of every 14 [Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement] lawyers is devoted to considering the 
discovery requests in this case.  Every [Department of Homeland Securi-
ty] litigation lawyer at [Department of Homeland Security] headquarters 
is considering the discovery requests in this case.  Programmatic interests 
are being subordinated to follow the discovery requests in this case.”431  
                                                            
 426.   Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873, 878 (W.D. Tenn. 1972). 
 427.   In re Price, No. 17-71121 (9th Cir. filed Apr. 19, 2017). 
 428.   Id. at 9. 
 429.   See In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017). 
 430.   Id. at 445. 
 431.   Josh Gerstein, Appeals Courts Block Access to DACA Cancellation Files, POLITICO (Oct. 
 
2018 ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS AND THE COURTS 71 
If the agency is subject to a preliminary injunction, temporary restraining 
order, or an APA stay,432 then it is prevented from executing its mission 
for that much longer.  The longer the APA review process extends (it 
took over a decade for the Overton Park dispute to reach the Supreme 
Court, which did not even finally resolve the dispute433), the more likely 
it is to extend past the tenure of a single agency head.434  This can stymy 
agency action if a new head comes in and wants simply to reverse 
course.435 
Second, the current record rule landscape can harm petitioners as 
well.  Although instances are not readily found in case law, an agency, if 
ordered to supplement, might take advantage of the process and slip in 
post hoc rationalizations.  After all, agencies have enormous investments 
in their decisions.436  As one scholar put it, 
An agency also may work for months or even years on the process of 
reaching a decision—engaging the public, preparing detailed and 
lengthy environmental and other analyses, and consulting with other 
agencies, tribes, and governmental bodies.  In this light, a great deal is 
often riding on the contents of an agency’s administrative record.437 
Third, as the inconsistent district and circuit court decisions address-
ing the scope of the APA record indicate, the current practice fosters ju-
dicial indeterminacy.  In turn, before litigation an agency may decide to 
                                                            
24, 2017, 10:45 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/24/dreamers-daca-appeals-courts-
access-244138 [https://perma.cc/78RD-H8BK] (quoting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Hashim 
Mooppan). See, e.g., Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); In re United 
States, 138 S. Ct. 443. 
 432.   See 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2012). 
 433.   Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 421–22 (1971) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
 434.   See, e.g., id. at 422–23 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“The administrative decisions 
under attack here are not those of a single Secretary; some were made by the present Secretary’s 
predecessor and, before him, by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Public Roads.”). 
 435.   Cf. Lawrence Hurley, Trump’s Transgender Move Puts Spotlight on Supreme Court Case, 
REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2017, 3:17 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-lgbt-court/trumps-
transgender-move-puts-spotlight-on-supreme-court-case-idUSKBN1622LH [https://perma.cc/2T95-
HMFT] (describing how Trump’s Department of Education reversed Obama’s Department of Edu-
cation’s decision on whether Title IX covers transgender students, which then led to the Trump Ad-
ministration (successfully) asking the Supreme Court to dismiss certiorari granted for a case on this 
issue); see Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (Mem) (2017) (vacating 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision in the transgender student’s favor “in light of the guidance document 
issued by the Department of Education and Department of Justice on February 22, 2017.”).  
 436.   See Walter O. Boswell Mem’l Hosp. v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“To 
review more than the information before the Secretary at the time she made her decision risks our 
requiring administrators to be prescient or allowing them to take advantage of post hoc rationaliza-
tions . . .”). 
 437.   Rohlf, supra note 78, at 603–04. 
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overcorrect in its compilation of the record to avoid later supplementa-
tion or discovery.  This concern could drive the unsettled interagency 
guidance on record creation and preservation, as agencies are unsure 
which courts will permit petitioners to add to the administrative record in 
federal court.  Many commentators discount the virtues of presuming 
agency regularity.438  But the “ambiguity, confusion, and even contradic-
tion [over what needs to end up in the record] increases the overall like-
lihood that agencies will produce less than a ‘full’ record supporting their 
decisions.”439 
Because different standards apply in different circuits, it is hard for 
an agency to predict what a court will do with the administrative record 
that it furnishes.  Because they are part of the federal government and 
perform actions that may have dispersed effects, agencies may be subject 
to personal jurisdiction in several different district courts.  Under the 
fractured, circuit-dependent law, the sufficiency of the record comes 
down to where the petitioner files a suit.  The costs imposed on the agen-
cy could vary depending on the judge assigned to the case. 
Even if a court denies a motion to supplement the record, the agency 
can be disadvantaged because the mere filing of a motion to supplement 
the record can force the court to examine verboten material.  The Tenth 
Circuit, despite employing several record rule exceptions itself, ob-
served: “[W]hen such justifications are offered the court is forced as a 
practical matter to examine the material, whether or not motions to sup-
plement the record are granted.”440  This, in turn, may increase the prob-
ability that the agency settles.  Judicial willingness to improperly com-
plete or supplement the record can change the risk calculus of 
representative counsel because such judicial orders imply a propensity to 
rule against the government on the merits. 
This judicial indeterminacy may unnecessarily expend the judiciary’s 
time and resources as well.  If “[t]he court’s inquiry outside the record is 
limited to determining whether the agency has considered all relevant 
factors or has explained its course of conduct or grounds of decision,”441 
the question raised is whether the evidence sought goes to the merits or 
to the “consideration of all relevant factors” inquiry.  This can be diffi-
cult to correct, as courts of appeals typically review district courts’ de-
                                                            
 438.   See Saul, supra note 203, at 1312–13 (arguing that the presumption should be rebutted 
with a “minimal” showing of irregularity, given the importance of delivering the reviewing court a 
full record).  
 439.   Rohlf, supra note 78, at 607. 
 440.   Am. Mining Cong. v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617, 626 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 441.   Animal Def. Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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terminations of whether to allow in extra-record evidence for abuse of 
discretion.442  In the In re United States DACA case, the per curiam Su-
preme Court disclaimed an interest in engaging with the underlying dis-
covery dispute, remanding for the district court to examine the agency’s 
jurisdictional defenses first.443  While a majority of the Court stayed the 
discovery order, four dissenting Justices explicitly complained that the 
Court was “poorly positioned to second-guess district courts’ determina-
tions in this area.”444  This suggests that even wrong decisions about the 
APA “whole record” may evade correction.  A court might engage in a 
simple order to supplement or complete the record, knowing that its mar-
gin for error is accordingly wide even beyond the deferential “abuse of 
discretion” standard of appellate review. 
Fourth, permitting consideration of extra evidence might contribute 
to the erosion of the arbitrary and capricious standard, replacing it with 
some less deferential standard.445  It may not approach the neat category 
of de novo review, although some scholars have questioned the con-
sistency with which courts apply these standards of review.446 
Fifth, the current state of 5 U.S.C. § 706 interpretation raises consti-
tutional separation of powers concerns.447  The practice unwarrantedly 
intrudes on the legislative branch, as recognized in the Vermont Yankee 
principle that the judiciary may not impose requirements on the execu-
tive that the legislature has not.448  This could be especially intrusive 
                                                            
 442.   See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497, 507 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010); Axiom Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Little 
Co. of Mary Hosp. v. Sebelius, 587 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2009); Citizens for Alts. to Radioactive 
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 443.   See In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443, 445 (2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 443. 
 444.   In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371, 375 (Breyer, J., dissenting from grant of stay). 
 445.   Axiom Res. Mgmt., Inc., 564 F.3d at 1380 (“The purpose of limiting review to the record 
actually before the agency is to guard against courts using new evidence to ‘convert the “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard into effectively de novo review.’”); see Aram A. Gavoor & Daniel Miktus, 
Oversight of Oversight: A Proposal for More Effective FOIA Reform, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 525, 
538–39 (2017) (discussing how courts review agency action under the Freedom of Information Act, 
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 446.   See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 679 (2002). 
 447.   Amfac Resorts, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Interior, 143 F. Supp. 2d 7, 11 (D.D.C. 2001) (“Were 
courts cavalierly to supplement the record, they would be tempted to second-guess agency decisions 
in the belief that they were better informed than the administrators empowered by Congress and ap-
pointed by the President.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace 
v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 751 F.2d 1287, 1325–26 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled on other 
grounds, 789 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc))). 
 448.   Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
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where courts order the production of an administrative record early in the 
action, before the government has had a chance to brief initial jurisdic-
tional issues, and before the court has decided a motion to dismiss on ju-
risdictional grounds.  A particularly striking example of this overreach 
arises when a judge ordered an acting cabinet member to sit for a four-
hour deposition, even before the cabinet member’s agency could file a 
motion to dismiss.449  The Supreme Court, which overturned that or-
der,450 has shown interest in maintaining separation of powers in the 
realm of administrative law.  For example, in recent years, some Justices 
have begun calling for the elimination of so-called “Seminole Rock” or 
“Auer” deference on separation of powers grounds.451  Some Members of 
Congress have recently proposed legislation that would shift case law 
deference framework on questions of law away from federal agencies.452 
Of course, the judiciary has an important role to play in APA re-
view.453  Many aspects of APA review do require legal determinations 
from the court, including the ultimate standard of review and determina-
tion as to whether the record presented by the agency to the court is “the 
whole record.”  But, the judiciary can review agency action just as effi-
ciently with a more predictably assembled record that is subject to fewer 
challenges.  If it is simply that the judiciary wants to review agency ac-
tion more penetratingly, then that is for Congress to decide. 
Sixth, improperly interpreting the record rule is wrong because it 
flouts the rule of law.  The record rule springs from 5 U.S.C. § 706, 
which largely addresses matters of review within the judiciary’s domain.  
The APA, this administrative bill of rights, may be nonspecific,454 but as 
                                                            
 449.   Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Case Nos. C 17-5211, C 17-
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 450.   See In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017). 
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discussed above, there are several good, relatively clear reasons why the 
APA record rule means what we think it does, and there is little justifica-
tion for the courts deviating from that interpretation.  Courts’ unwilling-
ness to hew to the law or their ignorance to take the straightforward step 
in properly interpreting the record rule is further compounded by the fact 
that not all courts are doing this.  This makes the scofflaws stand out 
even further and gives them opportunities to reassess that not many 
courts have taken. 
The problems presented by the judiciary’s and litigants’ approach to 
APA administrative records may be worsening, given the hyper-
partisanship and the growing resources of advocacy groups that now may 
emerge to be the heyday of strategic issue advocacy.  For those who ve-
hemently disagree with the underlying policy of an executive agency, 
even lawfully acted upon, APA challenges are a potent way to attack the 
agency and publicly signal disapproval.  Litigation over the past five 
years provides such examples.455  Once in litigation, 5 U.S.C. § 706 
sleights of hand are an easy way to maintain the offensive, as the peti-
tioners in the DACA case were able to do with the district judge, selling 
him on “verbal inputs.”456  This profoundly affects the operation of gov-
ernment, inconsistent with the rule of law. 
V. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO STABILIZE THE SPACE 
Petitioners and agencies in APA litigation should forcefully and con-
sistently advance the foregoing, proper interpretation of an APA record 
and how it should be judicially reviewed.  Courts, in turn, should follow 
this proper interpretation.  Recognizing the proper scope of the adminis-
trative record will facilitate a more efficacious and consistent execution 
of the APA. 
To follow this easier and more proper route, a court should refuse the 
administrative record as presented only if the petitioner demonstrates, by 
a standard of at least a “strong showing,” that the record is demonstrably 
incomplete.457  The court should also permit the parties to add to the rec-
                                                            
agency action being challenged.  For example, the APA is the least specific concerning informal 
adjudication. 
 455.   See supra note 363. 
 456.   Statement of Dist. Court in Response to Application for a Stay, No. 17A570 at 4, (Dec. 5, 
2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-801/22797/20171206145957950_17A570 
%20In%20Re%20United%20States%20Response%20NDCA.pdf [https://perma.cc/A52P-4FBG]. 
 457.   Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (requiring a 
“strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” to permit augmentation of the administrative 
record in federal court). 
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ord any materials to which they jointly stipulate, and should take judicial 
notice where appropriate, like for example, background information nec-
essary to understand complex subject matter.  If the court finds that com-
pletion or a limited supplementation may occur, the court should consid-
er whether the agency can simply add the concerned materials in federal 
litigation without engaging in civil discovery.  If not, the remedy should 
then be remand to the agency, with or without vacatur, with or without 
judicial retention of jurisdiction, for the agency to correct.  This should 
hold whether the problem is properly identified as the record, or whether 
the issue is that the court “can’t tell” if the record is complete or if the 
agency considered all factors.  In other words, courts must be vigilant 
about not turning merits problems into record problems.  This would en-
sure that courts remain faithful to 5 U.S.C. § 706’s exhortation to review 
only “the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party,” with consid-
eration of the role of prejudicial error.458 
Under this correct reading, Overton Park comes out largely the 
same.  Overton Park presented what we would call a completion issue: a 
set of materials the agency relied upon to make its decision that was not 
before the court.  Because those materials were not presented to the court 
as part of the administrative record (only post hoc affidavits were), the 
Court rightly sent the case back down to the district court. However, the 
district court should have remanded the case to the agency to submit a 
record, or to reformat its decision and submit that record.  The district 
court should not have taken evidence to decide whether the agency ac-
tion satisfied the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of the APA.  Later 
Supreme Court cases such as Lorion later seemed to appreciate that dif-
ference. 
This raises the question of how to encourage judicial compliance 
with these rules. Chiefly, advocates need to be aware of the proper scope 
of the record to accurately educate the court.  Additionally, the U.S. Su-
preme Court could step in to articulate clear guidelines.  Lower courts 
are imprecise about the record rule and allow various exceptions that 
might not rise to the level of a circuit split.  But it may be enough if a pe-
tition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus shows that there is a policy of 
                                                            
 458.   Steven Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts to Limit the Record 
in Review of Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN L. REV. 333, 359 (1984) (arguing that those doctrines 
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national importance. 
The Supreme Court has recently corrected a different longstanding 
misinterpretation of the APA.  In 2015, it reversed a D.C. Circuit line of 
authority requiring notice-and-comment for non-legislative rulemaking, 
holding it exceeded the APA’s minimum requirements and thus violated 
Vermont Yankee.459  The Supreme Court also granted the writ of manda-
mus on this subject in In re United States.460  Although the Court empha-
sized that it was not opining on the merits of the APA record issues, the 
Court arguably took up the case only because the legal dispute arose 
from an agency action to terminate a program that generated significant 
news coverage and affected hundreds of thousands of individuals over 
the program’s relatively short lifespan.  If the Supreme Court did take up 
and resolve a case presenting the issues undergirding this Article, it 
would likely be a watershed administrative law case on par with Overton 
Park itself.  Despite the Court’s flirtation with the topic in the In re Unit-
ed States DACA case, after the Court’s remand there is no indication that 
it will again review the case on this topic.  Even though the Supreme 
Court again touched on the topic in the 2018 In re Dep’t of Commerce 
census question case, a merits decision might involve only the “bad faith 
and improper behavior” exception, and not the record scope in general.461  
It might very well be another thirty years before the Court broaches the 
subject again. 
The first branch of government, Congress, could also address the 
problem legislatively, although that is even less likely.  Congress could 
amend the APA to more clearly define “record” or identify what proce-
dures it wishes to use for APA record compilation and review.  This 
would be especially useful with regard to informal adjudication proce-
dures which are not clearly outlined in the APA.  However, Congress 
rarely amends the APA, and has never substantively amended 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706 since it was first passed in 1946.462 
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From time to time, Congress has introduced bills to amend the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act with regard to what makes up the record.  For 
instance, the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011, House Report 3010, 
would have amended § 553 to provide special procedures for “major 
rules, high-impact rules, and rules involving novel legal or policy is-
sues.”463  For judicial review of the procedures of passing such rules, the 
record on review would generally have included “all documents and in-
formation considered by the agency and any additional information pre-
sented by a party that the court determines necessary to consider to as-
sure justice.”464  Generally, the agency would have to: 
include in the record for a rule making, and shall make available by 
electronic means and otherwise, all documents and information pre-
pared or considered by the agency during the proceeding, including, at 
the discretion of the President or the Administrator of the Office of In-
formation and Regulatory Affairs, documents and information commu-
nicated by that Office during consultation with the Agency.465 
Although less desirable than a universal fix from Congress, the agencies 
could also promulgate regulations to clarify the meaning of the arguably 
ambiguous phrase “the whole record,” although that might vary from 
agency to agency and lead to greater confusion. 
The best option would be to have the courts address the issue in their 
rulemaking capacities.  The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure al-
ready give some treatment to record contents, albeit the record on ap-
peal.466  Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have a trans-
substantive grain, passing rules for particular subject matter is not new.467  
Congress and the Supreme Court passed specific rules governing habeas 
cases and motions for post-conviction relief in the late 1970s.468  The 
Administrative Conference of the United States, an independent govern-
ment agency that examines administrative law issues, recently called for 
Congress and the Supreme Court to enact specific rules for Social Secu-
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rity benefits appeals.469  The Supreme Court could pass these rules with-
out congressional assistance, as the Rules Enabling Act permits the Court 
to promulgate “general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in 
the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate 
judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”470 
Lower courts could also accomplish this, to a degree.  Many lower 
courts have local court rules, consistent with Overton Park, that stream-
line the process of putting the record in front of the court for judicial re-
view.  Most courts rules are procedural.  For example, some excuse suits 
from initial disclosures if review is on the record,471 or exempt such suits 
from a scheduling order.472  Some rules are more substantive, making 
clear that the judicial record is coextensive with the agency record.473  
The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, for example, has particu-
larly comprehensive rules, disabling most of the default Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in favor of a simple process of adjudicating APA cases 
more aligned with their appellate-like nature than a traditional civil 
case.474 
Passing rules governing the procedure of APA review cases and us-
ing those rules to emphasize the grounds under which the composition of 
the administrative record may be challenged would discourage the fo-
rum-shopping that is now available to enterprising litigants.  Such rules 
would prevent litigants from forcing discovery and delving beyond the 
administrative record, as they are able to do in certain courts given the 
federal government’s susceptibility to suit in many jurisdictions.  This 
proposal would create many benefits to the taxpayers if their government 
agencies could have their actions reviewed in accordance with law.475 
 
                                                            
 469.   ADMIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, SPECIAL PROCS. FOR SOCIAL SECURITY LITIG. IN 
DISTRICT CT. (2016), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Recommendation 
%202016-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QYU-VB4D]. 
 470.   28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012). 
 471.   FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B)(i). 
 472.   S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. CIV. R. 16.1. 
 473.   D. WYO. CIV. R. 83.6(b)(1).  But see id. R. 83.6(b)(3) (permitting “supplementation of the 
record” in certain limited circumstances, upon motion filed within 14 days after the record is filed). 
 474.   See supra note 347. 
 475.    A recent law review article proposed other solutions.  Travis O. Brandon proposed that the 
parties more carefully hew to a proper taxonomy of the administrative record and extra-record evi-
dence—including by permitting completion.  Reforming the Extra-Record Evidence Rule in Arbi-
trary and Capricious Review of Informal Agency Actions: A New Procedural Approach, 21 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 981, 1007–17 (2017).  He also suggested that courts should be more willing to con-
sider extra-evidence if interested parties did not previously have an opportunity to present the evi-
dence to the agency (although his article does not explain how this additional imposition on the 
agencies to accept evidence comports with Vermont Yankee).  Id. at 1017–28. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
What goes into the administrative record reviewed by a court in an 
APA action is a deceptively simple inquiry: what materials did the agen-
cy consider in making the decision being challenged?  This topic has 
gone largely unexplored in literature, as courts—pressed by zealous ad-
vocates who chafe at the proper restrictions in APA practice not found in 
other civil actions—create a myriad of exceptions that seem reasonable. 
However, the APA’s text, history, structure, and purpose carefully delin-
eate the scope of the record, no matter how reasonable it may seem to al-
low the government or a petitioner to slip a few documents into the rec-
ord for judicial consideration. 
Although the APA’s record rule has been in the U.S. Code for over 
seventy years, the Supreme Court shows no sign of definitely resolving 
this issue.  Nevertheless, the issue is pressing, as an increasing number of 
heated lawsuits challenge administrative action and seek discovery or the 
supplementation of the administrative record.  Meanwhile, lower courts 
remain split in their approaches, contributing to uncertainty for massive 
bureaucracies seeking to implement best practices at minimum costs to 
the taxpayer. 
This Article chronicled why an agency sued under the APA merits 
the presumption that it is acting in accordance with the law and thus pre-
senting a true and complete copy of the administrative record to the 
court.  The only ground for adding material to that record should come if 
the petitioner can show that the record is demonstrably incomplete, 
whether by inadvertence or intent.  Additionally, in recognition of the re-
ality that agencies’ work can be complex and builds on years of immer-
sion in a particular subject matter, courts should be able to take judicial 
notice of uncontroversial and readily provable background material.  
Courts should also defer to the parties if they jointly stipulate to adding 
material to the record. 
Where the courts should draw the line is when a party wishes to avail 
itself of any number of the amorphous “supplementation” exceptions 
created over the years.  Whatever the reasons a party may give for want-
ing to add material to the record that the agency did not rely upon when 
it took the action under review, the court should resist the temptation to 
allow supplementation and instead conduct a merits inquiry on the record 
that is available.  If the record shows a legal flaw, or if the record is not 
full enough to permit a proper analysis, then the APA petition should 
succeed on the merits and the court should set aside the agency action 
and remand to the agency to address the issue.  This allows the agency to 
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proceed in due course and possibly resolve the dispute without further 
Article III intervention.  This approach both saves time and money for all 
involved and respects the separation of powers.  Until Congress or the 
courts prescribe a different regime, the bench and bar would benefit from 
the simplicity, if not correctness, of this approach. 
 
